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Abstract
We study solutions that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-
peaked preferences. Similar to Klaus and Storcken (2002), we ordinally extend these
preferences over intervals. Loosely speaking, we extend the results of Moulin (1980)
to our setting and show that the results of Ching (1997) cannot always be similarly
extended. Our main results are the following. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-
onliness characterize the class of generalized median solutions. Second, although peaks-
onliness cannot be replaced by the “weaker” property of continuity in our first result -as
is the case in Ching (1997)- this equivalence is achieved when voter-sovereignty is also
required. Finally, if preferences are symmetric and single-peaked, strategy-proofness
and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median solutions.
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crucial comment on an older version of this paper. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the financial support
from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNFS) for project 100018 156201.
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1 Introduction
We study the problem where an interval of alternatives is chosen on the interval [0, 1] based
on the preferences of a finite number of agents. This interval can be considered as the political
spectrum, while the chosen interval can in turn be considered as the legislative constitution
or the governmental coalition (in the sense that some “extreme” views are not accounted for
by the constitution or are not represented by any member(s) of the governmental coalition).
We assume that agents have single-peaked preferences defined over all alternatives on [0, 1];
that is, an agent’s welfare is strictly increasing up to his “peak” (his favorite alternative),
and is strictly decreasing thereafter. Moreover, we assume that agents, when comparing
two intervals, only consider their best (most favorite) alternative and their worst (least
favorite) alternative(s) on each interval. Finally, we look into the situation where the voting
mechanism choosing the interval of alternatives guarantees that the agents announce their
true preferences; in other words, we are interested in voting mechanisms -which we call
(choice) solutions- that are strategy-proof.
Although the classic result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite establishes that on the full do-
main of preferences -with more than two alternatives available- strategy-proofness and non-
dictatorship are incompatible (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), this is not true for the
domain of single-peaked preferences, the domain of interest in this paper.
This compatibility between the two aforementioned properties has been well studied in the
context of (choice) rules and for infinite sets of alternatives, where following the announce-
ment of the agents’ (single-peaked) preferences one alternative is chosen. Specifically, it
has been shown that strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness (the agents only announce their
peak) characterize the class of generalized median rules (described in Section 3.1) (Moulin,
1980). Moreover, when also requiring the property of either efficiency (in the Pareto sense),
or anonymity (the names of the agents don’t matter), or both to be satisfied, the sub-classes
of either efficient generalized median rules (Section 3.1), or median rules (Section 3.2), or
efficient median rules (Section 3.2) are characterized (Moulin, 1980). A similar result also
holds for the one-dimensional case, when the range of the rule is closed and not connected
(Barbera` and Jackson, 1994). In addition, on the smaller domain of quadratic and separable
preferences1 and on dimensions equal or larger to 1, peaks-onliness can be substituted by
1In this domain, an agent’s welfare depends on the distance of the alternative chosen from his peak, projected
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unanimity (when a common best alternative exists, it is chosen) (Border and Jordan, 1983);
furthermore, it turns out that in these results two of the required properties can be weakened;
specifically, peak-onliness and efficiency can be substituted by continuity (a small change
in the announced preferences does not change the outcome a lot) and voter-sovereignty (no
alternative is a priori excluded from being chosen) respectively (Ching, 1997).2 Finally, a
measure of manipulability was recently proposed, that can be used to compare two gener-
alized median rules (via some necessary and sufficient conditions) (Arribillaga and Masso´,
2016).
For the case where a single alternative is chosen among a finite set (of alternatives), strategy-
proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize, on the domain of strict preferences, a class
of rules similar to the class of efficient generalized median rules (Barbera` et al., 1993).
Moreover, the admissible preferences of all agents being top-connected3 characterize the
maximal domain in which (i) every strategy-proof and unanimous rule is a generalized
median rule, and (ii) every generalized median rule is strategy-proof (Achuthankutty and
Roy, 2017).
When departing from the setting where agents have single-peaked preferences and one alter-
native is chosen, a few more results should be mentioned. First, in the case of probabilistic
rules,4 where the agents’ single-peaked preferences are ordinarily extended over probability
distributions via first-order stochastic dominance, similar results to Moulin’s results (1980)
were achieved (Ehlers et al., 2002). Moreover, if the agents’ preferences are single-peaked but
two alternatives can be chosen, the properties of strategy-proofness, continuity, anonymity,
and users-only5 characterize the class of double median rules6 (Heo, 2013). Finally, if agents
in every dimension. Specifically, the larger the sum of all such projected distances, the smaller the welfare
gained.
2Although technically continuity is not weaker than peaks-onliness, loosely speaking, it imposes fewer re-
strictions on the result.
3For every agent and every pair of “neighboring” alternatives (a, b) there exist admissible preferences such
that a is the most favorite alternative and b is the second most favorite alternative.
4Given the agents’ preferences, a probability distribution over all alternatives is chosen.
5For each pair of chosen alternatives (a, b) the choice of a does not depend on agents preferring b over a.
6A double median rule can be decomposed into two median rules, where for each preference profile each one
selects one alternative.
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have single-dipped preferences,7 strategy-proofness and unanimity characterize the class of
collections of 0-decisive sets with a tie-breaker 8 (Manjunath, 2014).
In line with the related literature, our main results also make use of either the property of
peaks-onliness or a version of continuity adapted for our context (i.e., where an interval of
alternatives is chosen). In addition, we also study the sub-cases where solutions are either
efficient, or anonymous, or both. Concisely, our results are the following. First, in the
domain of single-peaked preferences, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the
class of generalized median solutions (Theorem 1); and if anonymity is also required, then
the sub-class of median solutions is characterized (Theorem 2). Second, neither of these re-
sults holds in the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences, nor can in these results
continuity substitute peaks-onliness (the counter-example on page 19). Third, in the domain
of single-peaked preferences, strategy-proofness, voter-sovereignty, and either peaks-onliness
or continuity characterize the class of efficient generalized median solutions (Theorem 3);
and if anonymity is also required, then the sub-class of efficient median solutions is char-
acterized (Theorem 4). Finally, in the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences,
the classes of efficient generalized median solutions and efficient median solutions can be
similarly characterized with one difference; due to single-peakedness being inherent in the
domain, continuity plays no role.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the model and states a preliminary result.
Section 3 includes the definitions of choice rules and solutions, as well as the definition of
the classes of such rules and solution we characterize. Section 4 contains the properties we
are interested in and some further preliminary results. Finally, Section 5 contains all non-
preliminary results and characterizations, as well as a table summarizing our results.
7An agent’s welfare is strictly decreasing up to his “dip” (his least favorite alternative), and is strictly
increasing thereafter.
8Each such rule chooses either the minimum or the maximum alternative. Loosely speaking, if all agents
are indifferent between the two alternatives the choice depends on the preference profile (over all other
alternatives). Otherwise, the choice depends on the number of agents preferring the minimum over the
maximum alternative, their identities, and their preferences.
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2 The model
Consider a coalition (of agents) N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, such that n ≥ 2, and a set of alternatives
A ≡ [0, 1].9 We denote generic agents by i and j, and generic alternatives by x and y. Each i
is equipped with preferences Ri, defined over A, that are complete, transitive, and reflexive.
As usual, xRiy is interpreted as “x is at least as desirable as y”, xPiy as “x is preferred to y”,
and x Ii y as “x is indifferent to y”. Moreover, for preferences Ri there exists an alternative
pi ∈ A, called the peak of i, with the following property: if either y < x ≤ pi or y > x ≥ pi,
we have xPiy. We call such preferences single-peaked and denote the domain of single-peaked
preferences by R. Furthermore, if for preferences Ri ∈ R, |x − pi| = |y − pi| implies x Ii y,
then we say these preferences are symmetric and denote the domain of symmetric preferences
by S.
In the sequel, all notation and definitions refer to domain R but also apply to domain S.
Moreover, all results presented in this section hold in both domains.
Let RN be the set of profiles R ≡ (Ri)i∈N such that for each i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R. Given R ∈ RN
and j ∈ N , we also use R and (R−j, Rj) interchangeably. For each R ∈ RN , we denote the
vector of peaks of R by p ≡ (pi)i∈N . Let the smallest peak in R be
¯
p ≡ min({pi}i∈N) and
the largest peak in R be p¯ ≡ max({pi}i∈N). Finally, let the convex hull of peaks of R be
Conv(p) ≡ [
¯
p, p¯].
Let the class of closed intervals in A be denoted by A. We denote generic sets in A by
X and Y . We denote the minimum of X by
¯
X ≡ min(X) and the maximum of X by
X¯ ≡ max(X). For each Ri ∈ R, we denote the best alternative(s) of i in X by bRi(X) ≡
{x ∈ X : for each y ∈ X, x Ri y} and the worst alternative(s) of i in X by wRi(X) ≡ {x ∈
X : for each y ∈ X, y Ri x}. Note that single-peakedness of Ri and non-emptiness of X
imply that the sets bRi(X) and wRi(X) contain one or two elements; specifically, if bRi(X)
(respectively, wRi(X)) contains two elements, agent i is indifferent between them. It is with
some abuse of notation that we treat sets bRi(X) and wRi(X) as if they are points and for
each x ∈ X, we write bRi(X)Ri x Ri wRi(X).
We extend all preferences Ri ∈ R, defined over A, to preferences defined over A according
9The set of alternatives is chosen without loss of generality. Essentially, our results hold for any closed
interval in R.
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to the “best-worst” extension of preferences characterized by Barbera` et al. (1984).10 Specif-
ically, when comparing two sets, an agent only considers his best and his worst point(s) in
each of them. Therefore, an agent prefers X to Y if he prefers his best point(s) in X to his
best point(s) in Y and his worst point(s) in X to his worst point(s) in Y . The following
definition also covers three more cases arising when an agent is indifferent between his best
or worst point(s) in the two sets.
With some abuse of notation, we use the same symbols to denote preferences over alternatives
and preferences over sets of alternatives.
Best-worst extension of preferences. For each i ∈ N with preferences Ri ∈ R, and each
pair X, Y ∈ A,
X Ri Y if and only if

bRi(X)Ri bRi(Y )
and
wRi(X)Ri wRi(Y ).
and
X Pi Y if and only if X Ri Y and

bRi(X) Pi bRi(Y )
or
wRi(X) Pi wRi(Y ).
This extension of preferences is transitive: for each triple X, Y, Z ∈ A, if XRi Y and Y RiZ,
then X Ri Z. However, it is not complete: there exist X, Y ∈ A such that neither X Ri Y
nor Y Ri X. To be precise, we now introduce the following definition.
Comparability. Given preferences Ri ∈ R, sets X, Y ∈ A are comparable if and only if
[bRi(X)Pi bRi(Y ) implies wRi(X)RiwRi(Y )] and [wRi(X)PiwRi(Y ) implies bRi(X)Ri bRi(Y )].
Based on the best-worst extension of preferences, we now define (Pareto) efficient sets.
10Preferences RAi defined over A satisfy weak-dominance (x PAi y implies {x} PAi {x, y} PAi {y}) and weak-
independence (given triple X,Y, Z ∈ A such that [X∩Z] = [Y ∩Z] = ∅, XPAi Y implies [X∪Z]RAi [Y ∪Z])
if and only if i compares sets in A according to the “best-worst” extension of preferences. Examples
illustrating the reasoning behind requiring these properties (in a slightly different model) are provided in
Klaus and Protopapas (2016).
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Efficient sets. Given profile R ∈ RN , set X ∈ A is efficient if and only if there is no set
Y ∈ A such that for each i ∈ N , Y RiX, and for at least one j ∈ N , Y Pj X; we denote the
class containing all efficient sets at R by E(R).
We now present a characterization of efficient sets in this setting that follows from Klaus
and Protopapas (2016). Note that the original result is a little more complicated since it
holds for all compact sets.
Proposition 1 (Klaus and Protopapas (2016)). At profile R ∈ RN , a closed interval is
efficient if and only if it is a subset of the convex hull of peaks in R.
3 Choice rules and solutions
In the sequel, all notation and definitions refer to domain R but also apply to domain S.
Moreover, all results presented in this section hold in both domains.
Each i ∈ N , announces preferences Vi ∈ R with associated announced peak vi ∈ A. Given
(true) profile R ∈ RN , if Vi = Ri, we say that i is sincere; otherwise, if Vi 6= Ri, we say
that i deviates. All terminology, notation, and results of Section 2, defined for preferences
Ri ∈ R, are carried over to announced preferences Vi ∈ R by replacing R and p by V and
v respectively, and adding the term “announced” as necessary. For example, since in profile
R ∈ RN the smallest peak is denoted by
¯
p ≡ min({pi}i∈N), in announced profile VN ∈ RN
the smallest announced peak is denoted by
¯
v ≡ min({vi}i∈N).
A (choice) solution F assigns to each V ∈ RN a set F (V ) ∈ A, i.e., F : RN → A. Given
V ∈ RN , let the minimum of F (V ) be
¯
F (V ) ≡ min{F (V )} and the maximum of F (V )
be F¯ (V ) ≡ max{F (V )}. We denote the family of solutions by F . Moreover, if a solution
F ∈ F assigns to each V ∈ RN an interval consisting of a single point we will refer to it as
a rule and use notation f ∈ f, i.e., f : RN → A.
Before defining in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 two classes of rules and solutions that our results
revolve around, the following definition is necessary: for each odd and positive integer k,
and each vector T ∈ Rk, label the coordinates of T such that t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tk; we define the
median (coordinate) of T by med(T ) ≡ t k+1
2
Finally, we would like the reader to notice that the classes of generalized median rules and
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solutions, defined in Section 3.1, are as the name suggests, a generalization of the classes
of median rules and solutions, defined in Section 3.2. Loosely speaking, this generalization
boils down to the agents influencing the chosen interval non-symmetrically. This is formally
shown in Lemma 4 (Section 3.2). The reason behind this sequencing is simple: our results
for the classes of generalized median rules and solutions can be easily shown to hold for the
subclasses of median rules and solutions respectively.
3.1 Generalized median rules and solutions
The first class of rules we consider was introduced under the name strategy-proof vot-
ing schemes and characterized by strategy-proofness11 and peaks-onliness12 (Moulin, 1980,
Proposition 3). It was later shown that peaks-onliness can be substituted with the “weaker”
property of continuity13 (Ching, 1997, Theorem). In order to provide a useful intuition in
understanding this class, we present an example inspired by the one provided in Arribillaga
and Masso´ (2016, p. 564).
Example 1. Consider the two agent case, i.e., N = {1, 2} and choose a 4-dimensional vector
α = (α∅, α{1}, α{2}, αN) such that αN ≤ α{1} ≤ α{2} ≤ α∅. Next, define the rule fα ∈ f as
follows. For each V ∈ RN , if v1 ≤ v2, choose α˜ = (α∅, α{1}, αN) and set fα(V ) = med(α˜, v),
and if v1 > v2, choose α˜ = (α∅, α{2}, αN) and set fα(V ) = med(α˜, v).
Notice that if α{1} 6= α{2}, then the agents have an asymmetric power in influencing the
chosen alternative. Before discussing further this asymmetry, in an effort to shed more light
on the behavior of fα, we first provide a second definition for it.
11No agent gains by deviating.
12The chosen alternative only depends on the vector of announced peaks.
13If the announced preferences change a ‘little’, the chosen alternative does not change “a lot”.
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For each V ∈ RN , fα(V ) =

αN if v1, v2 ≤ αN
v2 if v1 ≤ αN ≤ v2 ≤ α{1}
α{1} if v1 ≤ αN ≤ α{1} ≤ v2
med(v1, v2, α{1}) if αN ≤ v1 ≤ α{1}
v1 if α{1} ≤ v1 ≤ α{2}
med(v1, v2, α{2}) if α{2} ≤ v1 ≤ α∅
α{2} if v2 ≤ α{2} ≤ α∅ ≤ v1
v2 if α{2} ≤ v2 ≤ α∅ ≤ v1, and
α∅ if α∅ ≤ v1, v2.
It is easy to see from this second definition that the range of fα equals [αN , α∅]. Hence,
this rule can be interpreted as one assigning to agents 1 and 2 the power to choose an
alternative from the interval [αN , α∅]. Furthermore, as already briefly discussed, this power
is not symmetric among the agents but depends on the choice of α{1} and α{2}. For instance
in this example, since α{1} ≤ α{2}, agent 1 has a greater power than agent 2 in influencing
the chosen alternative.
To see this, fist consider agent 1. He can make sure that the chosen alternative is not larger
than α{1} and not smaller than v1 (by announcing v1 ≤ α{1}), or that it is not larger than
v1 and not smaller than α{1} (by announcing v1 ≥ α{1}). In addition, he is a dictator on the
interval [α{1}, α{2}].
Next, consider agent 2. He only has the power to influence the chosen alternative if agent
1 “allows” him to do so. That is, if αN ≤ v1 ≤ α{1}, then agent 2 can pinpoint the chosen
alternative on the interval [v1, α{1}], and if v1 ≤ αN ≤ α{1}, then agent 2 can pinpoint the
chosen alternative on the interval [αN , α{1}]. Similarly, if α{2} ≤ v1 ≤ α∅, then agent 2 can
pinpoint the chosen alternative on the interval [α{2}, v1], and if α{2} ≤ α∅ ≤ v1, then agent
2 can pinpoint the chosen alternative on the interval [α{2}, α∅].
The general n-agent case works as follows. First, take a vector α in A2
n
, i.e., the dimension
of α equals the number of all sub-coalitions in N (including the empty set). Specifically,
let α ≡ (αM)M⊆N , such that for each L ⊆ M , αL ≥ αM . Next, for an announced profile
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V with associated vector of announced peaks v, label the agents such that v1¯ ≤ · · · ≤ vn¯.14
Finally, construct vector α˜ in An+1 such that α˜ = (α∅, α{1¯}, α{1¯,2¯}, . . . , αN) and notice that
by construction, αN ≤ · · · ≤ α{1¯,2¯} ≤ α{1¯} ≤ α∅. The generalized median rule associated
with vector α chooses alternative med(v, α˜).
Generalized median rules. Let vector α ∈ A2n be such that α ≡ (αM)M⊆N , where for
each pair L,M ⊆ N with L (M , αL ≥ αM . Also, for each V ∈ RN , let bijection pi : N → N
be such that vpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vpi(n) and construct vector α˜ = (α∅, α{pi(1)}, α{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , αN). We
denote the generalized median rule associated with vector α by fαG, where for each V ∈ RN ,
fαG(V ) ≡ med(v, α˜). Finally, we denote the class of generalized median rules by fG.15
Clearly, if all agents announce different peaks, a unique ordering of them by their announced
peak exists. The next result shows (for generalized median rules) that if such a unique or-
dering does not exist, then the chosen alternative does not depend on the particular ordering
chosen.
Lemma 1. For each generalized median rule fαG, if vector α˜ is not unique, then the chosen
alternative does not depend on the specific choice of α˜.
Proof. Let fαG ∈ fG and V ∈ RN be such that for some agents i, j ∈ N , vi = vj.
Without loss of generality, label the agents such that v1¯ ≤ · · · ≤ vn¯. Hence, by the
definition of fG, we can construct α˜ = (α∅, . . . , α{1¯,...,i−1}, α{1¯,...,i}, α{1¯,...,i,j}, . . . , αN) and
α˜′ = (α∅, . . . , α{1¯,...,i−1}, α{1¯,...,j}, α{1¯,...,i,j}, . . . , αN). Clearly, if α{1¯,...,i} 6= α{1¯,...,j}, then α˜ 6= α˜′.
Let M = {1¯, . . . , i}, that is, αM = α{1¯,...,i}. Let fαG = med(v, α˜). We first show that if
fαG = αM , then αM = vi = vj. Let |M | = m. By definition of fG, αN ≤ α{1¯,...,n¯−1} ≤
· · · ≤ α{1¯} ≤ α∅, implying there are at least n + 1 − m coordinates of α˜ not larger than
αM (i.e., coordinates αM , . . . , αN) and at least m+ 1 coordinates of α˜ not smaller than αM
(i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , αM). Hence, fαG = med(v, α˜) implies at least m agents announce
peaks not larger than αM (i.e., agents 1¯, . . . , i) and at least n −m agents announce peaks
not smaller than αM (i.e., agents j, . . . , n¯). Therefore, since vi = vj, αM = vi = vj.
14Whenever two agents announce the same peak, no unique way to label the agents exists. However, as is
shown in Lemma 1, the specific choice of labels does not affect the chosen alternative.
15 It should be noted that in the literature a generalized median rule fαG ∈ fG is often described as follows:
For each V ∈ RN , each M ⊆ N , and each i ∈M , fαG = max
M⊆N
min
i∈M
{pi, αM}.
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By symmetric arguments, it can be shown that if fαG = med(v, α˜
′) = α′{1¯,...,j}, then α
′
{1¯,...,j} =
vi = vj. Therefore, f
α
G = vi = vj = αM = α
′
{1¯,...,j} contradicts that αM 6= α′{1¯,...,j}.
The first class of solutions we characterize in Section 5 extends the spirit of generalized
median rules to solutions. Specifically, take two vectors α ≤ β, each of dimension 2n, such
that α ≡ (αM)M⊆N and β ≡ (βM)M⊆N . Next, for an announced profile V with associated
vector of announced peaks v, label the agents such that v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and construct
vectors α˜ and β˜, each of dimension n + 1, such that α˜ = (α∅, α{1}, α{1,2}, . . . , αN) and
β˜ = (β∅, β{1}, β{1,2}, . . . , βN). The generalized median solution associated with vectors α
and β chooses the interval where the minimum alternative is med(v, α˜) and the maximum
alternative is med(v, β˜).
Generalized median solutions. Let vectors α, β ∈ A2n be such that α ≡ (αM)M⊆N and
β ≡ (βM)M⊆N , with α ≤ β, and for each pair L,M ⊆ N , with L ( M , αL ≥ αM and βL ≥
βM . Also, for each V ∈ RN , let bijection pi : N → N such that vpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vpi(n) and con-
struct vectors α˜ = (α∅, α{pi(1)}, α{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , αN) and β˜ = (β∅, β{pi(1)}, β{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , βN).
We denote the generalized median solution associated with vectors α and β by Fα,βG , where for
each V ∈ RN , Fα,βG (V ) ≡ [med(v, α˜),med(v, β˜)]. Finally, we denote the class of generalized
median solutions by FG.
Remark 1. By definition of FG and fG, for each profile V , Fα,βG (V ) ≡
[med(v, α˜),med(v, β˜)] = [fαG(V ), f
β
G(V )]. Therefore, a generalized median solution F
α,β
G can
be decomposed into two generalized median rules fαG and f
β
G.
The next result considers single-valued generalized median solutions.
Lemma 2. A generalized median solution Fα,βG is single-valued if and only if α = β. More-
over, in this case Fα,βG is essentially a generalized median rule.
16
Proof. Let Fα,βG ∈ FG and fαG, fβG ∈ fG. Let V ∈ RN . By Remark 1, Fα,βG (V ) =
[fαG(V ), f
β
G(V )]. If α = β, then F
α,β
G = {fαG(V )}. Hence, Fα,βG is single-valued.
If Fα,βG is single-valued, then F
α,β
G = [f
α
G(V ), f
β
G(V )] implies f
α
G(V ) = f
β
G(V ). Assuming α 6= β
results in a contradiction as follows. Since α 6= β, there exists a coalition M ⊆ N such that
16To be precise, a single-valued generalized median solution assigns singleton sets of alternatives while the
corresponding generalized median rule assigns the alternatives contained in these sets.
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αM 6= βM . Let |M | = m and specify V such that for each agent i ∈M , vi = 0, and for each
agent j ∈ N \M , vj = 1. Hence, at profile V , the mth coordinate of vectors α˜ and β˜ will be
αM and βM respectively. Moreover, by definition of FG, αN ≤ α{1,...,n−1} ≤ · · · ≤ α{1} ≤ α∅
and βN ≤ β{1,...,n−1} ≤ · · · ≤ β{1} ≤ β∅. Thus, there are at least n + 1 − m coordinates
of α˜ not larger than αM (i.e., coordinates αM , . . . , αN) and at least m + 1 coordinates of α˜
not smaller than αM (i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , αM). Similarly, there are at least n + 1 −m
coordinates of β˜ not larger than βM and at least m+1 coordinates of β˜ not smaller than βM .
Hence, Fα,βG = [med(v, α˜),med(v, β˜)] = [αM , βM ] contradicting that F
α,β
G is single-valued.
Therefore, Fα,βG (V ) being single-valued implies α = β.
Our results in Section 5 will also concern efficient generalized median solutions. Formally,
given Fα,βG ∈ FG, if for each V ∈ RN , Fα,βG ∈ E(V ), we say that Fα,βG is an efficient generalized
median solution and denote the class of efficient generalized median solutions by FEG. The
next result concerns this class of solutions.
Lemma 3. A generalized median solution F a,bG is an efficient generalized median solution if
and only if vectors α, β are such that αN = βN = 0 and α∅ = β∅ = 1.
Proof. Let Fα,βG ∈ FG. Assuming that Fα,βG ∈ FEG such that α, β are not as described
above, results in a contradiction as follows.
If αN 6= 0 or βN 6= 0, choose V ∈ RN such that v = (0, . . . , 0). By Proposition 1, E(V ) = 0
and by the definition of FG, Fα,βG (V ) = [αN , βN ]. Hence, Fα,βG (V ) 6∈ E(V ). Similarly, if
α∅ 6= 1 or β∅ 6= 1, choose V ∈ RN such that v = (1, . . . , 1). Again, by Proposition 1,
E(V ) = 1 and by the definition of FG, Fα,βG (V ) = [α∅, β∅]. Hence, Fα,βG (V ) 6∈ E(V ). Finally,
if αN = βN = 0 and α∅ = β∅ = 1, then for each V ∈ RN , med(v, α˜) ∈ Conv(v) and
med(v, β˜) ∈ Conv(v). Hence, by the definition of FG, Fα,βG (V ) ⊆ Conv(v), and thus by
Proposition 1, Fα,βG (V ) ∈ E(V ).
3.2 Median rules and solutions
The second class of rules we consider was introduced under the name strategy-proof and
anonymous voting schemes and characterized by strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and
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anonymity17 (Moulin, 1980, Proposition 2). This class of rules is a simplification of gen-
eralized median rules since now all agents possess the same power in influencing the chosen
alternative. For the 2-agent case, it suffices to set α{1} = α{2} in Example 1 (page 8).
The general n-agent case works as follows. Take a vector a in An+1. For an announced
profile V with associated vector of announced peaks v, the median rule associated with a
chooses alternative med(v, a).
Median rules. Let vector a ∈ An+1 be such that a ≡ (a1, . . . , an+1), where a1 ≤ · · · ≤
an+1. We denote the median rule associated with vector a by f
a
M , where for each V ∈ RN ,
faM(V ) ≡ med(v, a). Finally, we denote the class of median rules by fM .
The second class of solutions we characterize in Section 5 extends the spirit of median rules
to solutions. Specifically, take two vectors a ≤ b , each of dimension n+1. For an announced
profile V with associated vector of announced peaks v, the median solution associated with
a and b chooses the interval where the minimum alternative is med(v, a) and the maximum
alternative is med(v, b).
Median solutions. Let vectors a, b ∈ An+1 be such that a ≡ (a1, . . . , an+1) and b ≡
(b1, . . . , bn+1), with a ≤ b, a1 ≤ · · · ≤ an+1, and b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bn+1. We denote
the median solution associated with vectors a and b by fa,bM , where for each V ∈ RN ,
F a,bM (V ) ≡ [med(v, a),med(v, b)]. Finally, we denote the class of median solutions by FM .
Remark 2. By definition of FM and fM , for each profile V , F a,bM (V ) ≡
[med(v, a),med(v, b)] = [faM(V ), f
b
M(V )]. Therefore, a median solution F
a,b
M can be decom-
posed into two median rules faM and f
b
M .
The next result formally proves that median rules and solutions are special cases of general-
ized median rules and solutions respectively.
Lemma 4. The class of median rules (solutions) is a subclass of the class of generalized
median rules (solutions).
Proof. Let F a,bM ∈ FM and faM , f bM ∈ fM . Let V ∈ RN . By Remark 2, F a,bM (V ) =
[faM(V ), f
b
M(V )]. Hence, by Remark 1, it suffices to show that the class of median rules
is a subclass of the class of generalized median rules.
17The names of the agents do not affect the chosen alternative.
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Let fαG ∈ fG by choosing vector α ∈ A2n such that the weight of each coalition only depends
on its cardinality. That is, for each M ⊆ N , choose αM = an+1−|M | (i.e., choose α∅ = an+1,
for each i ∈ N , choose α{i} = an, for each i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, choose α{i,j} = an−1, and
so on). Thus, α˜ = a. Therefore, med(v, α˜) = med(v, a) and by definition of fG and fM ,
fαG(V ) = f
a
M(V ).
The next result considers single-valued median solutions.
Lemma 5. A median solution F a,bM is single-valued if and only if a = b. Moreover, in this
case F a,bM is essentially a median rule.
18
The proof of Lemma 5 follows from Lemmas 2 and 4.
Our results in Section 5 also concern efficient median solutions. Formally, given F a,bM ∈ FM ,
if for each V ∈ RN , F a,bM ∈ E(V ), we say that F a,bM is an efficient median solution and
denote the class of efficient median solutions by FEM . The next result concerns this class
of solutions.
Lemma 6. A median solution F a,bM is an efficient median solution if and only if vectors a, b
are such that a1 = b1 = 0 and an+1 = bn+1 = 1.
The proof of Lemma 6 follows from Lemmas 3 and 4.
4 Properties of solutions
In the sequel, all properties are defined for solutions in domain R but also apply to solutions
in domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this section hold in both domains.
The two first properties we consider are related; the first is our efficiency notion for solutions
while the second, being weaker than the first, requires no alternative in A to be a priori
excluded from being selected.
Efficiency. For each V ∈ RN , F (V ) ∈ E(V ).
Voter-sovereignty. For each x ∈ A, there exists V ∈ RN such that F (V ) = {x}.
18To be precise, a single-valued median solution assigns singleton sets of alternatives while the corresponding
median rule assigns the alternatives contained in these sets.
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The next property, which is central in our results, requires no agent to gain by deviating.
Moreover, it implies comparability between the chosen sets before and after an agent’s
deviation.
Strategy-proofness. For each i ∈ N , each Ri ∈ R, and each V ∈ RN , F (V−i, Ri) Ri
F (V−i, Vi).
The next property requires the chosen set to depend only on the vector of announced
peaks.
Peaks-onliness. For each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that v = v′, F (V ) = F (V ′).
Loosely speaking, the next property requires when the announced preferences of an agent
change “a little”, the minimum and maximum alternatives chosen to not change “a lot”.
Before describing it formally, we must first define the three following notions. First, the
“indifference relation”, which -loosely speaking- given preferences Vi ∈ R, maps each alter-
native x to an alternative y, that i finds indifferent to x, according to Vi. Formally, for each
Vi ∈ R, the indifference relation rVi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is defined as follows. For each x ∈ [0, vi],
rVi(x) = y if y ∈ [vi, 1] exists such that y Ii x, or rVi(x) = 1 otherwise; while for each
x ∈ [vi, 1], rVi(x) = y if y ∈ [0, vi] exists such that y Ii x, or rVi(x) = 0 otherwise. Second,
the distance between a pair Vi, V
′
i ∈ R, which is measured using the indifference relation.
Formally, it is defined to be d(Vi, V
′
i ) ≡ maxx∈[0,l] |rVi(x) − rV ′i (x)|. Finally, the notion of
convergence. Specifically, for k ∈ N+, a sequence {V ki } in R converges to Vi, if k → ∞
implies the distance d(Vi, V
k
i )→ 0. We denote this convergence by V ki → Vi.
Min/max continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , and each {V ki } in R,
if V ki → Vi, then
¯F (V−i, V ki )→ ¯F (V ), andF¯ (V−i, V ki )→ F¯ (V ).
Notice that min/max continuity for rules is equivalent to the regular continuity property for
rules (with respect to the preference profile).
Lemma 7. The following two statements for solutions are equivalent.
(i) Min/max continuity is satisfied.
(ii) Upper-hemi continuity and lower-hemi continuity are satisfied.19
19Both properties are formally defined in Appendix A.
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We prove Lemma 7 in Appendix A.
The next property requires that the agents’ identities do not matter.
Anonymity. For each bijection σ : N → N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that for each
i ∈ N , Vi = V ′σ(i), F (V ) = F (V ′).
The last property we consider depends only on the announced peaks of the agents. Loosely
speaking, following a change in an agent’s announced preferences, if before and after this
change both announced peaks lie on the same side of the minimum (maximum) chosen
alternative, then the minimum (maximum) chosen alternative does not change.
Uncompromisigness. For each i ∈ N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that V ′−i = V−i,
if
vi < ¯F (V ) and v′i ≤ ¯F (V ) orvi >
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≥ ¯F (V ),
then
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′), and
if
vi < F¯ (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ) orvi > F¯ (V ) and v′i ≥ F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
When a solution does not satisfy uncompromisingness, we say that it is compromised.
5 Results
We begin by presenting in Section 5.1 results concerning interrelations between the properties
presented in Section 4. Said results are then used in our characterization results presented
in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Loosely speaking, in Section 5.2, we extend the characterizations
of Moulin (1980, Propositions 2 and 3)20 to solutions; while in Section 5.3, we show that in
some -but not all- of these characterizations, peaks-onliness can be substituted by min/max
continuity. Finally, in section 5.4 we show that the properties in all our characterization
results are independent.
20Proposition 2: A rule satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and anonymity in R if and only if it is
a median rule. Proposition 3: A rule satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness in R if and only if it
is a generalized median rule.
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5.1 Interrelations between properties
Our first result in this section holds in domain S. It shows that if strategy-proofness is
satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equivalent.
Proposition 2. For strategy-proof solutions efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equivalent
in domain S.
We prove Proposition 2 in Appendix B.
A similar equivalence result holds in domain R, albeit slightly weaker since peaks-onliness or
min/max continuity is also required. By Proposition 2, this result trivially holds in domain
S as well.
Proposition 3. The following two statements for strategy-proof solutions hold.
(i) If peaks-onliness is satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equivalent.
(ii) If min/max continuity is satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equivalent.
We prove Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
The next result holds only in domain R.21 It shows that strategy-proofness and peaks-
onliness are equivalent with uncompromisingness.
Proposition 4. The following two statements for solutions are equivalent in domain R.
(i) Strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness are satisfied.
(ii) Uncompromisingness is satisfied.
We prove Proposition 4 in Appendix C.
The next result is in the spirit of Proposition 4 and holds in domain S.
Proposition 5. The following two statements for solutions are equivalent in domain S.
(i) Strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty are satisfied.
(ii) Uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty are satisfied.
We prove Proposition 5 in Appendix C.
Our final result also concerns uncompromisingness. It holds in both domains R and S.
21An example of Proposition 4 not holding in domain S is illustrated by the counter-example on page 19.
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Proposition 6. Each solution satisfying strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, and voter-
sovereignty also satisfies uncompromisingness.
We prove Proposition 6 in Appendix C.
5.2 Results in the single-peaked domain R
We now present our characterization results for (generalized) median solutions, as well as
a counter-example justifying the absence of such results in some cases. All results hold in
domain R. The extension of these results in domain S is discussed in Section 5.3.
Our first result concerns the class of generalized median solutions.
Theorem 1. The following three statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness.
(iii) F is a generalized median solution.
The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Propostion 4. We prove the equiva-
lence of statements (ii) and (iii) in Appendix D; note that this part of the proof also holds
in domain S.
Our second result concerns the class of median solutions.
Theorem 2. The following three statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and anonymity.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and anonymity.
(iii) F is a median solution.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Propostion 4. We proceed
by showing the equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii) in two steps; note that this part of
the proof also holds in domain S.
Step 1 - (statement (ii) implies statement (iii)): Let F ∈ F satisfy uncompro-
misingness and anonymity. By Theorem 1, F (V ) = Fα,βG (V ). Moreover, anonymity im-
plies for α, β ∈ A2n that for each pair L,M ⊆ N , if |L| = |M |, then αL = αM and
βL = βM . Thus, for each M ⊆ N , let an+1−|M | = αM and bn+1−|M | = βM , to effectively
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construct vectors a, b ∈ An+1. Next, let F a,bM ∈ FM and notice that for each V ∈ RN ,
Fα,βG (V ) = [med(v, α˜),med(v, β˜)] = [med(v, a),med(v, b)] = F
a,b
M (V ).
Step 2 - (statement (iii) implies statement (ii)): Let F a,bM ∈ FM . In addition, let
Fα,βG ∈ FG by choosing vectors α, β ∈ A2
n
such that the weight of each coalition only depends
on its cardinality; specifically, for each M ⊆ N , αM = an+1−|M | and βM = bn+1−|M |. Hence,
for each V ∈ RN , Fα,βG (V ) = [med(v, α˜),med(v, β˜)] = [med(v, a),med(v, b)] = F a,bM (V ).
Therefore, by Theorem 1, F a,bM satisfies uncompromisingness and by the definition of FM ,
F a,bM satisfies anonymity.
Next, we show that in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 peaks-onliness cannot be substituted with
min/max continuity. We illustrate this in the counter-example that follows by proposing
a solution satisfying strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, and anonymity and violat-
ing voter-sovereignty -and more importantly- uncompromisingness; which, as shown in the
aforementioned theorems, is satisfied by both classes of generalized median solutions and
median solutions. Moreover, as explained in Section 5.3, this example also illustrates that
the aforementioned theorems cannot be extended in domain S.
Counter-example. Let |N | ≥ 1 and define r∗V ≡ max{rVi(0)}i∈N , that is, at announced
profile V , among the indifferent announced alternatives to 0 of each agent i ∈ N , r∗V is
the largest one. Next, define F ∗ ∈ F as follows. For each V ∈ RN , F ∗(V ) = [0, r∗V ]. By
definition, it follows that F ∗ satisfies min/max continuity and anonymity, and that it violates
voter-sovereignty. We proceed in 2 steps
Step 1: We show F ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness. Let V ∈ RN (V ∈ SN) be such that i ∈ N
is sincere, i.e., Vi = Ri. Also, let V
′
i ∈ R (V ′i ∈ S) such that V ′i 6= Vi. There are two cases.
Case 1. Let rVi(0) = r
∗
V . By single-peakedness, bRi(F
∗(V )) = {pi}, implying i’s best
point does not improve by deviating at V , and 0 ∈ wRi(F ∗(V )). By the definition of F ∗,
0 ∈ F ∗(V−i, V ′i ), hence i’s worst point(s) does not improve by deviating at V . Therefore,
F ∗(V )Ri F ∗(V−i, V ′i ).
Case 2. Let rVi(0) < r
∗
V . By single-peakedness, bRi(F
∗(V )) = {pi}, implying i’s best point
does not improve by deviating at V , and wVi(F
∗(V )) = {r∗V }. By the definition of F ∗,
r∗V ∈ F ∗(V−i, V ′i ), hence i’s worst point does not improve by deviating at V . Therefore,
F ∗(V )Ri F ∗(V−i, V ′i ).
19
Step 2: We show that F ∗ can be compromised. Let N = {1, . . . }. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ SN be
defined as follows: V−1 = V ′−1, v1 = 0.2, v
′
1 = 0.3, and for each i ∈ N \ {1}, vi = 0. Hence,
r∗V = rV1(0) = 0.4 and r
∗
V ′ = rV ′1 (0) = 0.6. Therefore, F (V ) = [0, 0.4] and F (V
′) = [0, 0.6].
Clearly, F is compromised.
We conclude this section by presenting the “efficient versions” of Theorems 1 and 2. Notice
that now peaks-onliness and min/max continuity become substitutable.
Theorem 3. The following four statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and voter-sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F satisfies strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, and voter-sovereignty.
(iv) F is an efficient generalized median solution.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Propostion 4. The equiva-
lence of statement (ii) and (iv) is shown as follows. By Theorem 1, statement (ii) implies
F ∈ FG. Hence, by the definition of FG, F satisfies peaks-onliness. Thus, Proposition 3 and
the definition of FEG imply F ∈ FEG, i.e., statement (ii) implies statement (iv). Moreover,
by Theorem 1 and FEG ( FG, statement (iv) implies F satisfies uncompromisingness; in
addition, by the definition of FEG, statement (iv) implies F satisfies efficiency and there-
fore voter-sovereignty, i.e., statement (iv) implies statement (ii). Finally, notice that this
equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv) also holds in domain S.
Next, by Proposition 6, statement (iii) implies statement (ii). We complete the proof
by showing statement (ii) implies statement (iii). By Step 1 of the proof of Theo-
rem 1(statement (ii) implies statement (iii)) on page 42, if F ∈ F satisfies uncompro-
misingness, then for V ∈ RN and each i ∈ N the following holds. If V 0i is such that
v0i = 0 and V
1
i is such that v
1
i = 1, then ¯
F (V ) = med(
¯
F (V ),
¯
F (V−i, V 0i ), ¯
F (V−i, V 1i )) and
F¯ (V ) = med(F¯ (V ), F¯ (V−i, V 0i ), F¯ (V−i, V
1
i )). It follows by the median operator, that state-
ment (ii) implies F satisfies min/max continuity. Finally, by the equivalence of statements
(i) and (ii), statement (ii) implies F satisfies strategy-proofness.
Theorem 4. The following four statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F satisfies strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty.
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(iv) F is an efficient median solution.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i), (ii), and (iii) follows from Theorem 3. The equiv-
alence of statements (ii) and (iv) is shown as follows. By Theorem 2, statement (ii) implies
F ∈ FM . Hence, Proposition 3 and the definition of FEM imply F ∈ FEM , i.e., statement
(ii) implies statement (iv). Moreover, by Theorem 2 and FEM ( FM , statement (iv) im-
plies F satisfies uncompromisingness, and anonymity ; in addition, by the definition of FEM ,
statement (iv) implies F satisfies efficiency and therefore voter-sovereignty, i.e., statement
(iv) implies statement (ii). Finally, notice that this equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv)
also holds in domain S.
5.3 Results in the single-peaked and symmetric domain S
We now show the characterizations in domain S that are -loosely speaking- equivalent to
those presented in Section 5.2 for domain R. Specifically, the non-efficient characterizations
in domain R (Theorems 1 and 2) cannot be extended in domain S. This is illustrated by
the counter-example presented on page 19, where the suggested solution satisfies strategy-
proofness, anonymity, and min/max continuity in domain S but violates uncompromising-
ness. This violation is of importance because as shown by the proof of Theorem 1 (statement
(iii) implies statement (ii)) on page 39 -which also holds in domain S- both classes of gener-
alized median solutions and median solutions satisfy uncompromisingness.
Concerning the efficient characterizations in domain R, these do extend in domain S. More-
over, since single-peakedness is an inherent property of domain S, min/max continuity is
unnecessary in these characterizations.
Theorem 5. The following three statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F is an efficient generalized median solution.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Proposition 5. The equiva-
lence of statements (ii) and (iii) follows from Theorem 3 (recall that as noted on page 20,
statements (ii) and (iv) of Theorem 3 are also equivalent in domain S).
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Theorem 6. The following three statements for a solution F ∈ F are equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, voter-sovereignty, and anonymity.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness, voter-sovereignty, and anonymity.
(iii) F is an efficient median solution.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Proposition 5. The equiva-
lence of statements (ii) and (iii) follows from Theorem 4 (recall that as noted on page 21,
statements (ii) and (iv) of Theorem 4 are also equivalent in domain S).
5.4 Independence of properties
Concerning the independence of the properties used in all our results, consider the following
four solutions. First, solution F ∗ proposed by the counter-example on page 19. Second, let
solution F1 ∈ F choose the minimum announced peak when more than two agents prefer it
against the maximum announced peak, and choose the maximum announced peak otherwise.
Hence in domain R, F1 satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty but
violates peaks-onliness. Third, for a small and positive value ε let solution F2 ∈ F choose the
minimum of: (a) the minimum announced peak plus ε and (b) the maximum peak. Hence
in both domains R and S, F2 satisfies peaks-onliness, min/max continuity, anonymity, and
voter-sovereignty but violates strategy-proofness. Finally, let F3 ∈ F be the “constant”
solution that always chooses 0. Hence in both domains R and S, F3 satisfies anonymity and
uncompromisingness.
The summary table that follows has a double purpose. First, columns FG, FEG, FM , and
FEM , denoting the classes of generalized median solutions, efficient generalized median solu-
tions, median solutions, and efficient median solutions respectively, summarize our charac-
terization results. For example, in the column referring to FEG, the circle containing number
4 shows that in domain S, strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of
efficient generalized median solutions. The table also shows the independence of our proper-
ties in all our characterization results. Specifically, all combinations of properties that need
to be checked to check the aforementioned independence, are satisfied by at least one of the
four non-median solutions proposed in the previous paragraph, as shown by columns F ∗, F1,
F2, and F3; this is shown by a check mark in each respective column. Finally, notice that
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for the reader’s convenience, all results in domain R are shown using circled black numbers
in a white background, while all results in domain S are shown using circled white numbers
in a black background.
FG FEG FM FEM F ∗ F1 F2 F3
Domain R # À Á À Á Â À À À Á À Á Â À À 3 3 3
Domain S  À À À Í Î À À À Í Î 3 3 3
.
Strategy-proofness À À À Á À Í À À À À Á À Í À 3 3
Peaks-onliness À À À À À À À À À À À À À À 3
Min/max continuity À Á À À À À Á À À À 3 3
Voter-sovereignty À Á Â Í Î À Á Â Í Î 3 3
Anonymity À Á À Á Â Í Î 3 3 3 3
Uncompromisingness À Á À À Â À Î À Á À À Â À Î 3
FG: class of generalized median solutions, FEG: class of efficient generalized median solutions,
FM : class of median solutions, and FEM : class of efficient median solutions.
Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 7
In the sequel, all properties are defined for solutions in domain R but also apply to solutions
in domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this section, hold in both domains.
Upper-hemi continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , each {V ki } in R such that
V ki → Vi, and each {xk} in A such that xk → x, the following holds. For each k ∈ N+, if
xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ), then x ∈ F (V ).
Lower-hemi continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , and each {V ki } in R such that
V ki → Vi, the following holds. If x ∈ F (V ), then there exists {xk} in A such that xk → x
and for each k ∈ N+, xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ).
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Proof of Lemma 7. Let F ∈ F . If F satisfies upper-hemi continuity and lower-hemi
continuity then trivially, it also satisfies min/max continuity. Next, let F satisfy min/max
continuity, V ∈ RN , and {V ki } be in R. We show that F satisfies upper-hemi continuity
and lower-hemi continuity in two steps.
Step 1. We show F satisfies upper-hemi continuity. Let {xk} in A such that xk → x and
for each k ∈ N+, xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ). Hence, for each k ∈ N+, ¯F (V−i, V
k
i ) ≤ xk ≤ F¯ (V−i, V ki ).
Moreover, by min/max continuity,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) → ¯F (V ) and F¯ (V−i, V
k
i ) → F¯ (V ), which
implies
¯
F (V ) ≤ x ≤ F¯ (V ) since otherwise, min/max continuity would imply that there
exists k∗ ∈ N+ such that xk∗ 6∈ F (V−i, V k∗i ). Therefore, x ∈ F (V ).
Step 2. We show F satisfies lower-hemi continuity. Let x ∈ F (V ). By min/max continuity,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) → ¯F (V ) and F¯ (V−i, V
k
i ) → F¯ (V ). Moreover, there exists {xk} in A, such
that for each k ∈ N+,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) ≤ xk ≤ F¯ (V−i, V ki ). Therefore, by min/max continuity,
xk → x.
B Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
Before proceeding to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3, we show the following. When
strategy-proofness is satisfied, voter sovereignty is equivalent with unanimity ; a property
stronger than voter-sovereignty but weaker than efficiency, that requires when all agents an-
nounce the same peak, only this peak to be chosen.22 This result holds in both domains.
Lemma 8. For strategy-proof solutions, voter-sovereignty and unanimity are equivalent.
Proof. Let F ∈ F . Trivially, unanimity implies voter sovereignty. Hence, let F satisfy
strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. We show that F satisfies unanimity.
Let a ∈ A and R ∈ RN be such that p = (a, . . . , a). By voter-sovereignty, there exists
V ∈ RN such that F (V ) = a. Let M ⊆ N contain all the agents in N whose announced
peak at V is not a, i.e., for each i ∈ M , vi 6= a, and for each j ∈ N \M , vj = pj = a.
Without loss of generality, index the agents in N such that M = {1, . . . ,m}. Next, consider
profile V 1 = (V−1, R1). By strategy-proofness, F (V 1) R1 F (V ). Hence, single-peakedness
22Formally, given F ∈ F , for each V ∈ RN such that v = (x, . . . , x), F (V ) = {x}.
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and F (V ) = a = p1 imply F (V
1) = a. Finally, for each k = {2, . . . ,m} in increasing
indexing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , Rk). By the arguments presented for V
1,
F (V k) = F (V ) = a. Therefore, since V m = R, F (V m) = F (R) = a.
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 2, which makes use of Lemma 8. This proof holds
only in domain S because it makes use of the inherent peaks-onliness of this domain.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness. Let V ∈ SN and without
loss of generality, assume v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. The equivalence of unanimity and voter-sovereignty
follows by Lemma 8. In addition, it is trivial to show that efficiency implies unanimity.
Therefore, it remains to show that unanimity implies efficiency. We do so by contradiction;
specifically, we show that if F (V ) 6∈ E(V ), then unanimity is violated. There are two cases.
Case 1. Let v¯ < F¯ (V ). For all agents i ∈ N , define V ′i ∈ S to be such that v′i = vn.
First, consider agent 1, where
¯
v = v1 ≤ v¯ < F¯ (V ). By single-peakedness, either [F¯ (V ) ⊆
wV1(F (V )) and thus wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V )] or [¯F (V ) = wV1(F (V )) and thus v1 = ¯v < F¯ (V )
and single-peakedness imply
¯
F (V ) <
¯
v, and therefore, wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V )]. Next, recall
the indifference relation rVi and let x1 = rV1(wV1(F (V ))).
23 If F¯ (V ) ⊆ wV1(F (V )), then
v1 < F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness imply x1 < v1 =
¯
v and hence, x1 6∈ E(V ). Similarly, if
¯
F (V ) = wV1(F (V )), then ¯
F (V ) <
¯
v ≤ v¯ < F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness imply x1 > v¯ and
hence, x1 6∈ E(V ). Finally, assume R1 = V1 and consider V 1 = (V−1, V ′1). By strategy-
proofness, wR1(F (V )) R1 wR1(F (V
1)); hence, wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V ), x1 6∈ E(V ), and single-
peakedness implies wR1(F (V
1)) 6∈ E(V ). Therefore, E(V 1) ⊆ E(V ) implies wR1(F (V 1)) 6⊆
E(V 1); and thus, F (V 1) 6∈ E(V 1).
Next, consider agent 2 at profile V 1 and recall that wR1(F (V
1)) 6∈ E(V 1) and x1 6∈ E(V ).
Let x2 = rV2(wV2(F (V
1))). If
¯
F (V 1) ⊆ wR1(F (V 1)), then ¯F (V
1) < v1; hence, v1 ≤ v2,
single-peakedness, and V2 ∈ S imply
¯
F (V 1) ⊆ wV2(F (V 1)) and x2 ≥ F¯ (V ).24 Thus,
wV2(F (V
1)), x2 6∈ E(V 1). If F¯ (V 1) = wR1(F (V 1)), then v¯1 < F¯ (V 1); hence, v2 ≤ v¯1 and
23To be precise, if agent 1 has two worst points on F (V ), then with some abuse of notation, assume wV1(F (V ))
is the smallest of the two worst points, which implies that x1 is then the largest of the two worst points.
24To be precise, if agent 2 has two worst points on F (V 1), then with some abuse of notation, assume
wV2(F (V
1)) is the smallest of the two worst points, which implies that x2 is then the largest of the two
worst points.
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single-peakedness imply either [F¯ (V 1) ⊆ wV2(F (V 1)) and x2 < ¯v1] or [¯F (V
1) = wV2(F (V
1))
and v¯1 < F¯ (V 1) < x2]. Thus, wV2(F (V
1)), x2 6∈ E(V 1). Therefore, by the arguments
presented for V 1, F (V 2) 6∈ E(V 2).
Finally, for each k ∈ {3, . . . , n−1}, in increasing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , V ′k). By
the arguments presented for agents 1 and 2 above, F (V k) 6∈ E(V k). Therefore, at profile V n−1
where vn−1 = (vn, . . . , vn), F (V n−1) 6∈ E(V n−1) implying F (V n−1) 6= {vn} which contradicts
unanimity.
Case 2. Let
¯
v >
¯
F (V ). The proof is symmetric to Case 1.
Notice that although for didactic reasons Proposition 3 proceeds Proposition 4 in the main
text, the proof of Proposition 3 makes use of Proposition 4 (proof in Appendix C). Recall
that this result holds in both domains.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness. By Lemma 8, unanimity
and voter-sovereignty are equivalent. In addition, it is easy to show that efficiency implies
unanimity.
The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1 we show that if in addition to strategy-proofness,
F satisfies peaks-onliness and unanimity, the following holds. Given an announced profile
where an efficient set is chosen, if an agent with the minimum -but not unique- announced
peak changes his announcement by moving his announced peak to the right, an efficient set
is chosen again. Step 2 shows the same result but for the case where in addition to strategy-
proofness, F satisfies min/max continuity and unanimity. Finally in Step 3, by unanimity
and the intermediate results of Steps 1 and 2, we show that F satisfies efficiency.
Step 1. In addition to strategy-proofness, let F satisfy peaks-onliness and unanimity. By
Proposition 4, F also satisfies uncompromisingness. Let V ∈ RN and i ∈ N be such that
F (V ) ∈ E(V ) and vi =
¯
v but where i does not have the unique minimum peak. Hence, by
Proposition 1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(v). In addition, let V ′i ∈ R be such that v′i ≥ v¯. Assuming
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) < ¯
v implies
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) < vi ≤ v′i. Hence, by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V−i, V
′
i ) =
¯
F (V ) <
¯
v, which contradicts F (V ) ∈ E(V ). Similarly, assuming F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v′i implies
F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v
′
i ≥ vi. Hence, by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) = F¯ (V ) > v¯, which
contradicts F (V ) ∈ E(V ). Therefore, F (V−i, V ′i ) ∈ E(V ).
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Step 2. In addition to strategy-proofness, let F satisfy min/max continuity and unanimity.
Define V ∈ RN and V ′i ∈ R as in Step 1. By single-peakedness, wV ′i (F (V )) = ¯F (V ).
We show that F (V−i, V ′i ) ∈ E(V−i, V ′i ) by discrediting all three cases where F (V−i, V ′i ) 6∈
E(V−i, V ′i ).
Case 1. Let
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) < ¯
v. In addition, let Ri = V
′
i . By single-peakedness,
¯
F (V )Pi
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ), hence wRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) implies wRi(F (V ))PiwRi(F (V−i, V
′
i )). There-
fore, if at profile (V−i, V ′i ) agent i deviates by announcing Vi, his worst point improves. This
contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case 2. Let
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) > v
′
i. Since ¯
F (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ) ≤ v′i, by min/max continuity, there ex-
ists some profile V ′′i ∈ R such that V ′′i 6= V ′i and v′i ∈ F (V−i, V ′′i ). Let Ri = V ′i ; hence,
bRi(F (V−i, V
′′
i )) = v
′
i implying bRi(F (V−i, V
′′
i ))PibRi(F (V−i, V
′
i )). Therefore, if at profile
(V−i, V ′i ) agent i deviates by announcing V
′′
i , his best point improves. This contradicts
strategy-proofness.
Case 3. Let
¯
v ≤
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) ≤ v′i and F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v′i. In the following, we describe a series of
actions that when performed in sequence construct -after a finite number of “moves”- profile
V ′, such that v′ = (v′i, . . . , v
′
i) and F (V
′) 6= v′i, i.e., a profile at which unanimity is violated.
Action 1. Let profile V 0 = (V−i, V ′i ). Let N1 ( N be such that j ∈ N1 if and only if v0j 6= v′i
and v0j < ¯
F (V 0). If N1 = ∅, then proceed to Action 2. Otherewise, let j ∈ N1. By v0j <
¯
F (V 0) ≤ F¯ (V 0) and single-peakedness, bV 0j (F (V 0)) = ¯F (V
0) and wV 0j (F (V
0)) = F¯ (V 0). Let
V 1j = V
′
i and profile V
1 = (V 0−j, V
1
j ). Assume Rj = V
0
j . By strategy-proofness, bRj(F (V
0))Rj
bRj(F (V
1)) and wRj(F (V
0)) Rj wRj(F (V
1)); hence, by single-peakedness, either [
¯
F (V 0) ≤
¯
F (V 1) and F¯ (V 0) ≤ F¯ (V 1)] or [
¯
F (V 1) ≤ F¯ (V 1) < v0j ]. However, if ¯F (V
1) ≤ F¯ (V 1) < v0j ,
then by min/max continuity there exist preference V ∗j ∈ R such that v0j ∈ F (V 0−j, V ∗j ). This
violates strategy-proofness since if at profile V 0 agent j deviates by announcing V ∗, his best
point improves. Hence,
¯
F (V 0) ≤
¯
F (V 1) and F¯ (V 0) ≤ F¯ (V 1). Therefore, v′i < F¯ (V 1).
Next, let N2 ( N be such that k ∈ N2 if and only if v1k 6= v′i and v1k < ¯F (V
1). If N2 = ∅,
then proceed to Action 2. Otherwise, let k ∈ N2. In addition, let V 2k = V ′i and profile
V 2 = (V 1−k, V
2
k ). By the process described in the previous paragraph for agent j, v
′
i < F¯ (V
2).
Finally, repeat this process µ times (where µ is smaller than the number of agents, µ ≤ n−1)
until the following holds. Set Nµ ( N , constructed similarly to N1 and N2, is empty. When
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this occurs, proceed to Action 2.
Action 2. Let profile V¯ 0 = V µ−1. Let N¯1 ( N be such that j ∈ N¯1 if and only if v¯0j 6= v′i
and F¯ (V¯ 0) ⊆ wV¯ 0j (F (V¯ 0)). Recall that F¯ (V¯ 0) > v′i. If N¯1 = ∅, then proceed to Action 3.
Otherwise, let j ∈ N¯1 and notice that by Nµ = ∅ (as defined in Action 1), the choice of
N¯1 implies
¯
F (V¯ 0) ≤ v¯0j < F¯ (V¯ 0). Define V¯ 1j ∈ R such that v¯1j = v′i and wV¯ 1j (F (V¯ 0)) =
¯
F (V¯ 0), and let profile V¯ 1 = (V¯ 0−j, V¯
1
j ). Assume that Rj = V¯
0
j . By strategy-proofness,
wRj(F (V¯
0)) Rj wRj(F (V¯
1)); hence, by single-peakedness, F¯ (V¯ 0) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 1) and perhaps,
¯
F (V¯ 0) >
¯
F (V¯ 1). Assume that Rj = V¯
1
j . If ¯
F (V¯ 1) <
¯
F (V¯ 0) < v¯1j , then single-peakedness
implies wRj(F (V¯
0)) Pj wRj(F (V¯
1)). This violates strategy-proofness since if at profile V¯ 1
agent j deviates by announcing V¯ 0j , his worst point improves. Therefore, F¯ (V¯
0) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 1)
and
¯
F (V¯ 0) ≤
¯
F (V¯ 1). Hence, v′i < F¯ (V¯
1).
Next, if
¯
F (V¯ 0) <
¯
F (V¯ 1), perhaps there exist some agents j¯ ∈ N such that vj¯ < ¯F (V¯
1) ≤
F¯ (V¯ 1). If this is the case, then repeat the process described in Action 1 and denote the
resulting profile (again) by V¯ 1. If no such agents exist, then V¯ 1 is the profile constructed in
the end of the previous paragraph.
Following this, let N¯2 ( N be such that k ∈ N¯2 if and only if v¯1k 6= v′i and F¯ (V¯ 1) ⊆
wV¯ 1k (F (V¯
1)), where F¯ (V¯ 1) > v′i. If N¯2 = ∅, then proceed to Action 3. Otherwise, let
k ∈ N¯2 and notice that either by Nµ = ∅ (as defined in Action 1), or by Action 1 being
repeated in the previous paragraph, the choice of N¯2 implies
¯
F (V¯ 1) ≤ v¯1k < F¯ (V¯ 1). Define
V¯ 2k ∈ R such that v¯2k = v′i and wV¯ 2k (F (V¯ 1)) = ¯F (V¯
1), and let profile V¯ 2 = (V¯ 1−k, V¯
2
k ). By
the process described above for agent j, F¯ (V¯ 1) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 2) and
¯
F (V¯ 1) ≤
¯
F (V¯ 2). Moreover,
if
¯
F (V¯ 1) <
¯
F (V¯ 2), perhaps Action 1 needs to be repeated as explained in the previous
paragraph. In this case, V¯ 2 is the resulting profile after repeating Action 1, otherwise, V¯ 2
remains unchanged. In both cases, v′i < F¯ (V¯
2).
Finally, repeat this process for a finite integer µ (where µ is smaller than the number of
agents, µ ≤ n − 1) until the following holds. Set N¯µ ( N , constructed similarly to N¯1 and
N¯2, is empty. Notice that v
′
i < F¯ (V¯
µ−1) and proceed to Action 3.
Action 3. Let profile Vˆ 0 = V¯ µ−1 and recall that v′i < F¯ (Vˆ
0). Let Nˆ ( N be such that
j ∈ Nˆ if and only if vˆ0j 6= v′i and wVˆ 0j (F (V¯
0)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 0). Let j ∈ Nˆ and notice that by
vˆ0j < v
′
i < F¯ (Vˆ
0) and single-peakedness,
¯
F (Vˆ 0) < vˆ0j < F¯ (Vˆ
0). Define Vˆ 1j ∈ R such
that vˆ1j = v
′
i and wVˆ 1j
(F (Vˆ 0)) = F¯ (Vˆ 0), and let profile Vˆ 1 = (Vˆ 0−j, Vˆ
1
j ). Assume that
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Rj = Vˆ
0
j . By strategy-proofness, wRj(F (Vˆ
0)) Rj wRj(F (Vˆ
1)); hence, by single-peakedness,
either [
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1)] or [
¯
F (Vˆ 0) <
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and F¯ (Vˆ 0) < F¯ (Vˆ 1)].
Next, assume that Rj = Vˆ
1
j . If F¯ (Vˆ
1) > F¯ (Vˆ 0) > vˆ1j , then single-peakedness implies
wRj(F (Vˆ
0)) Pj wRj(F (Vˆ
1)). This violates strategy-proofness since if at profile Vˆ 1 agent
j deviates by announcing Vˆ 0j , his worst point improves. In addition, if F¯ (Vˆ
1) < vˆ1j =
bRj(F (Vˆ
0)), then single-peakedness implies bRj(F (Vˆ
0))PjbRj(F (Vˆ
1)). This violates strategy-
proofness since if at profile Vˆ 1 agent j deviates by announcing Vˆ 0j , his best point improves.
Therefore,
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and in addition, v′i ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 1) ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 0). Hence, v′i > ¯F (Vˆ
1).
Finally, notice that by single-peakedness,
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and v′i ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 1) ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 0) the
following holds; for each agent k ∈ Nˆ , wVˆ 0k (F (V¯
0)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 0) implies wVˆ 1k
(F (V¯ 1)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 1).
Hence, by the process described above for agent j, the announced peaks of all agents k ∈ Nˆ ,
such that k 6= j, can be sequentially changed to v′i and profile Vˆ |Nˆ | can be constructed.
Therefore, since vˆ|Nˆ | = (v′i, . . . , v
′
i), Vˆ
|Nˆ | = V ′, and hence, v′i > ¯
F (V ′) implies unanimity is
violated.
Step 3. Let V ∈ RN . Without loss of generality, index the agents in N such that v1 ≤
· · · ≤ vn. Let V ′ ∈ RN be such that V ′ = (V1, . . . , V1). By unanimity, F (V ′) = v1, hence
by Proposition 1, F (V ′) ∈ E(V ′). Next, consider profile V 2 = (V ′−2, V2) where v2 ≥ v′2 = v1,
¯
v2 =
¯
v′, and v¯2 ≥ v¯′. Step 1 or Step 2, and F (V ′) ∈ E(V ′) imply F (V 2) ∈ E(V 2). Finally, for
each k = {3, . . . , n}, in increasing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , Vk). By the arguments
presented for V 2, F (V k) ∈ E(V k). Therefore, since V n = V , F (V ) ∈ E(V ).
C Proofs of Propositions 4, 5, and 6
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 4 we present a lemma that holds only in do-
main R25 and concerns strategy-proof solutions satisfying peaks-onliness. Loosely speaking,
following an agent’s announcement change, there are restrictions on the chosen set.
Lemma 9. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness, each i ∈ N ,
and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that V−i = V ′−i, the following hold.
25It does not hold in domain S because the proof makes use of non-symmetrical single-peaked preferences.
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(i) If vi < F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), and if in addition vi <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) If vi >
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V ′), and if in addition vi > F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let F ∈ F satisfy
strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN and i ∈ N be such that V−i = V ′−i
and vi < F¯ (V ).
Suppose Ri is such that pi = vi and 0 Pi F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, F (V−i, Ri) = F (V ).
Hence, by single-peakedness and the choice of Ri, wRi(F (V−i, Ri)) = F¯ (V ). Thus, since
V ′ = (V−i, V ′i ), strategy-proofness implies F¯ (V )RiwRi(F (V
′)). Therefore, single-peakedness,
the choice of Ri, and 0 ≤ vi < F¯ (V ) imply wRi(F (V ′)) ≥ F¯ (V ), and hence, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
If in addition vi <
¯
F (V ), then by single-peakedness, bRi(F (V−i, Ri)) = ¯
F (V ). Thus, since
V ′ = (V−i, V ′i ), strategy-proofness implies ¯
F (V )Ri bRi(F (V
′)). Therefore, single-peakedness,
F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ), and vi <
¯
F (V ) imply
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ).
The proof of Proposition 4 follows and holds only in domain R because it makes use of
Lemma 9.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is split in two parts.
Part 1: We show that strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness imply uncompromisingness.
Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN and i ∈ N be
such that V−i = V ′−i. If vi = v
′
i, then peaks-onliness implies uncompromisingness. Hence, let
vi 6= v′i, and by symmetry of arguments, let vi < v′i. There are four cases. Notice that Case
1.1 overlaps with Case 2.1, while Case 1.2 overlaps with Cases 2.1 and 2.2.
Case 1.1. Let vi < v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ). By Lemma 9(i), ¯F (V ) ≤ ¯F (V
′). Moreover, assuming
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V ′) results in a contradiction as follows. Since v′i < ¯
F (V ′), Lemma 9(i) implies
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 1.2. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < v
′
i. By Lemma 9(ii), ¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ). Hence,
¯
F (V ′) < v′i, and by
Lemma 9(ii),
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2.1. Let vi < v
′
i ≤ F¯ (V ). By Lemma 9(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). Moreover, assuming
F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′) results in a contradiction as follows. Since v′i < F¯ (V
′), Lemma 9(i) implies
F¯ (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
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Case 2.2. Let F¯ (V ) < vi < v
′
i. By Lemma 9(ii), F¯ (V
′) ≤ F¯ (V ). Hence, F¯ (V ′) < v′i, and by
Lemma 9(ii), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
Part 2: We show that uncompromisingness implies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
Notice that this part of the proof also hold in domain S.
Let F ∈ F satisfy uncompromisingness. Let i ∈ N and pair V, V ′ ∈ RN be such that
V−i = V ′−i and Vi 6= V ′i . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We show that F satisfies peaks-onliness.
Let vi = v
′
i. If vi = ¯
F (V ), then assuming
¯
F (V ′) 6=
¯
F (V ) results in a contradiction, since
v′i = vi 6= ¯F (V
′) and uncompromisingness imply
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′). Similarly, if vi = F¯ (V ),
then assuming F¯ (V ′) 6= F¯ (V ′) results in a contradiction, since v′i = vi 6= F¯ (V ′) and un-
compromisingness imply F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′). Finally, if vi 6=
¯
F (V ) and vi 6= F¯ (V ), then by
uncompromisingness, F (V ) = F (V ′). Therefore, F satisfies peaks-onliness.
Step 2. We show that F satisfies strategy-proofness. Recall that Vi 6= V ′i and by symmetry
of arguments, let vi ≤ v′i. By Step 1, F satisfies peaks-onliness, hence, if vi = v′i, then
strategy-proofness is satisfied. By symmetry of arguments, let vi < v
′
i. We proceed in two
stages.
Stage 1. We show that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). There are 3 cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ). If vi < v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ), then by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V ) = ¯F (V
′).
Otherwise, if
¯
F (V ) < v′i, then consider the following. Assuming ¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) results in a
contradiction as follows. Let V 1i be such that v
1
i = ¯
F (V ′). Since vi <
¯
F (V ) and v1i < ¯
F (V ),
by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V−i, V 1i ) = ¯
F (V ). However, since
¯
F (V ′) < v′i and v
1
i = ¯
F (V ′),
by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V ′−i, V
1
i ) = ¯
F (V ′). Hence,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2. Let vi =
¯
F (V ) < v′i. Assuming ¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) results in a contradiction as follows.
Since
¯
F (V ′) < vi < v′i, by uncompromisingness, ¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ). Hence,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Case 3. Let vi >
¯
F (V ). Since vi < v
′
i, by uncompromisingness, ¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Stage 2. By Stage 1,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). We show that F satisfies strategy-
proofness. Let Ri = Vi. There are five cases.
Case 1. Let pi <
¯
F (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ), wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ),
bRi(F (V
′)) =
¯
F (V ′), and wRi(F (V
′)) = F¯ (V ′). Hence, by single-peakedness, i’s best and
31
worst points do not improve by deviating at V . Therefore, F (V )Ri F (V
′).
Case 2. Let pi =
¯
F (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi and wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ),
implying i can’t improve on his best point. Regarding his worst point, since F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′),
by peaks-onliness, wRi(F (V ))Ri F¯ (V
′). Therefore, F (V )Ri F (V ′).
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V ) < pi < F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi and wRi(F (V )) ⊆
{
¯
F (V ), F¯ (V )}, implying agent i can’t improve on his best point. Regarding his worst
point(s), since
¯
F (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V ) = ¯F (V
′). Since also
F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), by peaks-onliness, wRi(F (V ))Ri wRi(F (V ′)). Therefore, F (V )Ri F (V ′).
Case 4. Let pi = F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi and wRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ), implying
i can’t improve on his best point. Regarding his worst point, if
¯
F (V ) < F¯ (V ), then since
¯
F (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, and by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V ) = ¯F (V
′). Hence, F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′) implies
wRi(F (V )) Ri wRi(F (V
′)). Otherwise, if
¯
F (V ) = F¯ (V ), then wRi(F (V )) = pi, implying i
can’t improve on his worst point. Therefore, in both cases F (V )Ri F (V
′).
Case 5. Let pi > F¯ (V ). Since F¯ (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, by uncompromisingness, F (V ) = F (V ′).
Therefore, F (V ) Ii F (V
′).
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 5 we present two lemmata that hold only in
domain S (because they make use of Proposition 2) and concern strategy-proof solutions
satisfying voter-sovereignty. Loosely speaking, both show cases where following a change in
the preferences of some agents, there are restrictions in the minimum and maximum chosen
alternatives.
Lemma 10. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, each V ∈
SN , and each x ∈ A the following hold.
(i) Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each each i ∈ N , if vi ≤ x, then v′i = x, otherwise v′i = vi.
Then, x ≤ F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′); in addition, x ≤
¯
F (V ) implies
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each i ∈ N , if vi ≥ x, then v′i = x, otherwise v′i = vi.
Then, x ≥
¯
F (V ) implies
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V ′); in addition, x ≥ F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let F ∈ F satisfy
strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. By Proposition 2, F also satisfies efficiency. Let
V ∈ SN and x ∈ A be such that x ≤ F¯ (V ); and without loss of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn.
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Moreover, let V ′ ∈ SN be defined as follows. For each i ∈ N , if vi ≤ x, then v′i = x,
otherwise v′i = vi. Let M = {1, . . . ,m} ⊆ N be such that i ∈ M implies v′i = x. Hence,
V ′ = (Vx, . . . , Vx, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where Vx ∈ S and vx = x.
Begin from profile V . By efficiency and Proposition 1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(V ). Let R1 = V1,
hence v1 ≤ x ≤ F¯ (V ) implies wR1(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Next, let V 11 = Vx and consider profile
V 1 = (V−1, V 11 ). By efficiency and Proposition 1, F (V
1) ⊆ Conv(V 1), and by strategy-
proofness, wR1(F (V ))R1wR1(F (V
1)). Therefore, by single-peakedness, v1 ≤ F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 1).
If V 1 = V ′, then we are done. Otherwise, for each k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, in increasing order,
consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , V
k
k ). By the arguments presented for V
1, F¯ (V k−1) ≤ F¯ (V k).
Therefore, V m = V ′ implies F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
If in addition x ≤
¯
F (V ), then bR1(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ). In this case, begin from profile V and
construct profile V ′ as shown above. By the same arguments to the ones presented above,
but expressed for the best alternative instead of the worst, it follows that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Lemma 11. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, and each
V ∈ SN the following hold.
(i) Let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈ M implies vi =
¯
v. Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each
i ∈ N , if i ∈M , then v′i ≤ vi, otherwise v′i = vi. Then, ¯v < F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V
′); in
addition,
¯
v <
¯
F (V ) implies
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) Let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈ M implies vi = v¯. Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each
i ∈ N , if i ∈M , then v′i ≥ vi, otherwise v′i = vi. Then, v¯ > ¯F (V ) implies ¯F (V ) ≥ ¯F (V
′); in
addition, v¯ > F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let F ∈ F
satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, and V ∈ SN be such that
¯
v < F¯ (V ). By
Proposition 2, F also satisfies efficiency ; hence, Proposition 1 implies
¯
v < F¯ (V ) ≤ v¯. In
addition, let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈ M implies vi =
¯
v, and without loss of generality, let
M = (1, . . . ,m); hence,
¯
v < v¯ implies M ( N . Moreover, let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For
each i ∈ N , if i ∈ M , then v′i ≤ vi, otherwise v′i = vi. Finally, without loss of generality, let
v′1 ≤ · · · ≤ v′m < v′m+1 ≤ · · · ≤ v′n.
Begin from profile V and let δ = |¯v − F¯ (V )| > 0. Assume R1 = V1. By single-peakedness,
wR1(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Change the announced preferences of agent 1 to V
1
1 ∈ S as follows. If
|v′m − ¯v| < δ, then set v
1
1 = v
′
m, otherwise, set v
1
1 = ¯
v − δ
2
. By efficiency and Proposition 1,
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F (V−1, V 11 ) ⊆ Conv(V−1, V 11 ). By strategy-proofness, wR1(F (V ))R1wR1(F (V−1, V 11 )). There-
fore, |v11−¯v| < δ implies (in domain S) that F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V−1, V
1
1 ). Following this, sequentially
repeat this process for all agents i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (if such agents exist) and construct profile
V 1 = (V 11 , . . . , V
1
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 1). If v11 = v′m, proceed to the next
paragraph. Otherwise, let δ1 = |¯v1 − F¯ (V 1)| > 0, assume R1 = V 11 , and repeat the process
to construct profile V 2, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). If v21 = v′m, proceed to the next paragraph.
Otherwise, keep repeating this process until the profile V¯ m = (V ′m, . . . , V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn) has
been constructed, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V¯ m).
Next, repeat the process described above for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} (if such agents exist)
and construct profile V¯ m−1 = (V ′m−1, . . . , V
′
m−1, V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V¯ m−1).
Finally, continue repeating this whole process until the profile V¯ 1 = V ′ =
(V ′1 , . . . , V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn) has been constructed, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
If in addition,
¯
v <
¯
F (V ), begin from profile V , let δ = |¯v−
¯
F (V )| > 0, and construct profile
V ′ as shown above. By the same arguments to the ones presented above, but expressed for
the best alternative instead of the worst, it follows that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 5 that holds only in domain S because it
makes indirect use of Proposition 2 through Lemmas 10 and 11.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let F ∈ F . Part 2 of Proposition 4 on page 31 (which also holds
in S) shows that if F satisfies uncompromisingness then it also satisfies strategy-proofness.
Hence, it follows that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Next, we show that statement (i)
implies statement (ii).
Let F satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. Let i ∈ N and pair V, V ′ ∈ SN be
such that V−i = V ′−i. Without loss of generality, assume v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Since vi = v′i trivially
satisfies uncompromisingness in domain S, let vi 6= v′i. There are six cases.
Case 1.1. Let v′i < vi ≤ ¯F (V ). Since vi = ¯F (V ) = F¯ (V ) trivially satisfies uncompromis-
ingness, let vi < F¯ (V ). In addition, let M ( N be such that j ∈ M if and only if vj ≤ vi.
Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 to be such that V−M = V 1−M and where each
agent j ∈ M announces preferences V 1j = Vi. By construction of V 1 and Lemma 10(i),
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ). Moreover, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile
34
V . Since for each j ∈ M , vj ≤ v1j = ¯v
1, and for each k ∈ N \ M , vk = v1k > ¯v
1, by
Lemma 11(i), F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 1) and in addition, if vi <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Therefore,
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ).
Next, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = ¯v
1,
and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > ¯v
1, by Lemma 11(i), F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 1), and in addition,
if vi <
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Finally, begin from profile V ′ and consider
profile V 1. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > v′i, by
Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ′) and
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′) and
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 1.2. Let v′i > vi ≥ F¯ (V ). The proof is symmetric to Case 1.1.
Case 2.1. Let vi ≤
¯
F (V ) and vi < v
′
i. If v
′
i > F¯ (V ), then uncompromisingness is trivially
satisfied; hence, let v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). In addition, let M ( N be such that j ∈ M if and only
if vj ≤ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 to be such that V−M = V 1−M
and where each agent j ∈ M announces preferences V 1j = V ′i . By construction of V 1 and
Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ) and in addition, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
1) ≥
¯
F (V ). Moreover,
begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V . Since for each j ∈ M , vj ≤ v1j = ¯v
1, and for
each k ∈ N \M , vk = v1k > ¯v
1, by Lemma 11(i), if vi < F¯ (V
1), then F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 1) and in
addition, if vi <
¯
F (V 1), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) and in addition, if
v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
1) =
¯
F (V ). There are three sub-cases.
(i) Let v′i = F¯ (V ). Assume Ri = V
′
i . Hence, bRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Since V−i = V
′
−i, by
strategy-proofness, F¯ (V ) = v′i ∈ F (V ′). Thus, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ). Moreover, begin from profile
V ′ and consider profile V 1. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \M ,
v′k = v
1
k > v
′
i, by Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V
1) ≥ F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
(ii) Let v′i < F¯ (V ). Begin from profile V
1 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ M ,
v′j ≤ v1j = ¯v
1, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > ¯v
1, by v′i < F¯ (V ) and Lemma 11(i),
F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 1), and in addition, if v′i < ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
′) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Moreover, begin
from profile V ′ and consider profile V 1. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each
k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > v′i, by v′i < F¯ (V ) and Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ′), and in addition,
if v′i < ¯
F (V ′), then
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and in addition, if
v′i < ¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
(iii) Let v′i = ¯
F (V ). If v′i = ¯
F (V ) = F¯ (V ), then uncompromisingness is trivially satisfied;
hence, let v′i = ¯
F (V ) < F¯ (V ). As shown in the previous sub-case, F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ). Assume
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Ri = Vi. Since vi < v
′
i, by single-peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) and wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ).
Hence, V ′−i = V−i and strategy-proofness imply bRi(F (V ))Ri bRi(F (V
′)). Thus, by F¯ (V ′) =
F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Finally, assume Ri = V ′i . Since
v′i ≤ ¯F (V
′) ≤ F¯ (V ′), by single-peakedness, bRi(F (V ′)) = ¯F (V
′) and wRi(F (V
′)) = F¯ (V ′).
Hence, V ′−i = V−i and strategy-proofness imply bRi(F (V
′))Ri bRi(F (V )). Thus, by F¯ (V
′) =
F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness, bRi(F (V
′)) =
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2.2. Let vi ≥ F¯ (V ) and vi > v′i. The proof is symmetric to Case 2.1.
Case 3.1. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ) and v
′
i > vi. In addition, let M ( N be such that j ∈M if
and only if vj ≥ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 to be such that V−M = V 1−M
and where each agent j ∈ M announces preferences V 1j = V ′i . By construction of V 1 and
Lemma 10(ii),
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Moreover, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V .
Since for each j ∈ M , vj ≥ v1j = v¯1, and for each k ∈ N \M , vk = v1k < v¯1, by v′i > ¯F (V
1)
and Lemma 11(ii),
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V 1).
Next, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≥ v1j = v¯1,
and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k < v¯1, by v¯1 > ¯F (V
1) and Lemma 11(ii),
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V 1).
Finally, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 1. Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≥ v1j = v′i,
and for each k ∈ N \ M , v′k = v1k < v′i, by Lemma 10(ii), ¯F (V
1) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
If v′i > F¯ (V ), then we are done. If v
′
i ≤ F¯ (V ), then let L ( N be such that j ∈ L if and
only if vj ≤ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 2 to be such that V−L = V 2−L
and where each agent j ∈ L announces preferences V 2j = V ′i . By construction of V 2 and
Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let v′i < F¯ (V ). Begin from profile V
2 and consider profile V . Since for each j ∈ L,
v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and Lemma 11(i),
F¯ (V 2) ≤ F¯ (V ). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V 2).
Next, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 2. Since for each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = v′i,
and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k < v′i, by Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V 2) ≥ F¯ (V ′). Finally, begin
from profile V 2 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each
k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and Lemma 11(i), F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 2). Therefore,
F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
(ii) Let v′i = F¯ (V ). Assume Ri = V
′
i . By single-peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = v
′
i. Hence,
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V−i = V ′−i and strategy-proofness imply v
′
i ∈ F (V ′). Thus, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Assuming F¯ (V ′) > F¯ (V ) results in a contradiction as follows. Begin from profile V and
consider profile V 2. Since for each j ∈ L, vj ≤ v2j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \L, vk = v2k > v′i,
by Lemma 10(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). Moreover, begin from profile V 2 and consider profile V .
Since for each j ∈ L, vj ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \ L, vk = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2)
and Lemma 11(i), F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 2). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V 2).
Next, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 2 as described in the previous sub-case.
Since for each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > v′i, by Lemma 10(i),
F¯ (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V 2). Finally, begin from profile V 2 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ L,
v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and Lemma 11(i),
F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 2). Therefore, F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
Case 3.2. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ) and v
′
i < vi. The proof is symmetric to Case 3.1.
Finally, we present the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, and
voter-sovereignty. By Proposition 3, F also satisfies efficiency. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN and
i ∈ N be such that V−i = V ′−i. There are five cases.
Case 1.1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). Notice that if Ri = Vi, by single-peakedness,
bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) and wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ).
Assuming vi ≥
¯
F (V ′) leads to a contradiction as follows. By min/max continuity, there
exists V ∗i ∈ R such that ¯F (V−i, V
∗
i ) = vi. Assume Ri = Vi. By single-peakedness,
bRi(F (V−i, V
∗
i )) = vi 6∈ F (V ). Hence, if at profile V agent i deviates by announcing V ∗i , his
best point improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore, vi <
¯
F (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
Next, assuming
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) or F¯ (V ′) < F¯ (V ) leads to a contradiction as follows. As-
sume Ri = Vi. By vi <
¯
F (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ′) and single-peakedness, bRi(F (V ′))PibRi(F (V ))
or wRi(F (V
′))PibRi(F (V )). Hence, if at profile V agent i deviates by announcing V
′
i , his
best point or his worst point improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Finally, assuming
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V ′) or F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′) leads to a contradiction as follows.
Assume Ri = V
′
i . By v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness, bRi(F (V ))PibRi(F (V
′)) or
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wRi(F (V ))PibRi(F (V
′)). Hence, if at profile V ′ agent i deviates by announcing Vi, his best
point or his worst point improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Therefore, F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and in addition, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
′) =
¯
F (V ).
Case 1.2. Let vi =
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). By the same arguments to the ones presented in
Case 1.1 for the maximum point chosen, it follows that F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
Case 2.1. Let vi > F¯ (V ) and v
′
i ≥ ¯F (V ). By symmetric arguments to those presented in
Case 1.1, it follows that
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ) and in addition, if v′i ≥ F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
Case 2.2. Let vi = F¯ (V ) and v
′
i ≥ ¯F (V ). By symmetric arguments to those presented in
Case 1.2, it follows that
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ). By symmetry of arguments, let vi ≥ v′i. Without loss
of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and notice that by efficiency and Proposition 1, F (V ) ⊆
Conv(V ); hence, agent i 6∈ {1, n}. In addition, for each agent j ∈ N \ {i}, define preferences
V¯j ∈ R be such that V¯j = V ′i .
Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 = (V−1, V¯1). By efficiency and Proposition 1,
F (V ) ⊆ Conv(V ). Hence, since v1 =
¯
v, by either Case 1.1 (if v1 <
¯
F (V )) or Case 1.2
(if v1 =
¯
F (V )), F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ). Moreover, by efficiency and Proposition 1, F (V 1) ⊆
Conv(V 1); hence, v2 =
¯
v1. Next, for agents k ∈ {2, . . . , i}, in increasing order, consider
profile V k = (V k−1−k , V¯k). By the arguments presented for V
1, F¯ (V k) = F¯ (V ). Therefore,
at profile V i = (V¯1, . . . , V¯i, Vi+1, . . . , Vn), F¯ (V
i) = F¯ (V ). Finally, begin from profile V ′. By
the same technique as the one described for profile V , change the preferences of agents k ∈
{1, . . . , i − i}, in increasing order, to again construct profile V i = (V¯1, . . . , V¯i, Vi+1, . . . , Vn).
Therefore, F¯ (V i) = F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
Similarly, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then once can show that ¯F (V
′) =
¯
F (V ), by using symmet-
rical arguments to the ones presented above. Specifically, begin from profile V and
change the preferences of agents k ∈ {i, . . . , n}, in decreasing order, and show that
¯
F (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V¯i, . . . , V¯n) =
¯
F (V ). Finally, begin from profile V ′ and change the preferences
of agents k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, in decreasing order, and show that
¯
F (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V¯i, . . . , V¯n) =
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
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D Proof of Theorem 1 (equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii))
We first show for Theorem 1 that statement (iii) implies statement (ii) in domain R. More-
over, as discussed in Section 5.3, this result also holds in domain S.
Proof of Theorem 1 (statement (iii) implies statement (ii)). Let Fα,βG ∈ FG. By the
definition of FG, to show that Fα,βG satisfies uncompromisingness, it suffices to show that
the minimum and maximum chosen alternatives by Fα,βG are not compromised. Moreover,
by symmetry of arguments, we only need to show that
¯
Fα,βG (V ) is not compromised.
Let V ∈ RN and without loss of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Let i ∈ N and V ′ ∈ RN
be such that V−i = V ′−i. Moreover, let vi 6= ¯F
α,β
G (V ). Hence, ¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜) and
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜′). There are two cases.
Case 1. Let j ∈ N and
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜) = vj. Hence, vi 6= ¯F
α,β
G (V ) implies i 6= j. Since
at V , v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, at least j agents announce peaks smaller than or equal to vj and at least
n− j+ 1 agents announce peaks larger than or equal to vj. Thus, since there are n agents in
total and α˜ ∈ An+1, by the median operator, vector α˜ contains at least n− j+ 1 coordinates
smaller than or equal to vj and at least j coordinates larger than or equal to vj. Therefore,
since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, if j = 1, α{1} ≤ vj ≤ α∅, and otherwise, α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1}.
There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let vi <
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = vj, that is, i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}. This implies j ∈ {2, . . . , n} and
α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1}. In addition, let v′i ≤ vj. Thus, at profile V ′, at least j agents
announce peaks smaller than or equal to vj (i.e., agents 1, . . . , j) and at least n−j+1 agents
announce peaks larger than or equal to vj (i.e., agents j, . . . , n). Moreover, V−i = V ′−i and
v′i ≤ vj imply that v′i ≤ vj ≤ vj+1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, that is, the agents announcing the j − 1
smallest peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . , j − 1) also announce the j − 1 smallest peaks at
V ′. Similarly, the agents announcing the j smallest peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . , j) also
announce the j smallest peaks at V ′. Hence, coordinates α{1,...,j} and α{1,...,j−1} are included
in vector α˜′. Thus, α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1} and the definition of FG implies that vector α˜′
contains at least n− j + 1 coordinates smaller than or equal to vj and at least j coordinates
larger than or equal to vj. Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜′) = vj =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(ii) Let vi >
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = vj, that is, i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , n}. The proof is symmetric to (i).
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Case 2. Let M ⊆ N such that |M | = m. Let
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜) = αM , such that for
each i ∈ N , vi 6= αM . Hence, if |M | = 0, αM = α∅, and otherwise, αM = α{1,...,m}. Since
αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, vector α˜ contains at least n −m + 1 coordinates smaller than or equal to
αM (i.e., coordinates α{1,...,m}, . . . , αN) and at least m+1 coordinates larger than or equal to
αM (i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , α{1,...,m}). Thus, since there are n agents in total and none of
their announced peaks equals αM , by the median operator, at V , m agents announce peaks
smaller than αM (i.e., agents 1, . . . ,m) and n − m agents announce peaks larger than αM
(i.e., agents m+ 1, . . . , n). Therefore, since v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, if m = 0, αM = α∅ < v1, if m = n,
αM = αN > vn, and otherwise, vm < αM = α{1,...,m} < vm+1. There are four sub-cases.
(i) Let m = 0. Hence, αM = α∅ < v1 ≤ vi. In addition, let αM =
¯
Fα,βG ≤ v′i.
Thus, at V ′, all n agents announce peaks larger than αM . In addition, since αN ≤ · · · ≤
α∅ = αM , vector α˜′ contains at least n + 1 coordinates smaller than or equal to αM (i.e.,
coordinates α∅, . . . , αN) and at least 1 coordinate larger than or equal to αM (i.e., coordinate
α∅). Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜′) = αM =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(ii) Let m = n. The proof is symmetric to (i).
(iii) Let m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and vi < α{1,...,m} = αM . Hence, vi ≤ vm < αM < vm+1. In
addition, let v′i ≤ αM . Thus, at V ′, at least m agents announce peaks smaller than or equal
to αM (i.e., agents 1, . . . ,m) and n−m agents announce peaks larger than αM (i.e., agents
m+1, . . . , n). Moreover, V−i = V ′−i and v
′
i ≤ αM imply that v′i ≤ αM < vm+1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, that
is, the agents announcing the m smallest peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . ,m) also announce
the m smallest peaks at V ′. Hence, coordinate α{1,...,m} is included in vector α˜′. Thus,
the definition of FG implies that vector α˜′ contains at least n −m + 1 coordinates smaller
than or equal to αM and at least m+ 1 coordinates larger than or equal to αM . Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜′) = αM =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(iv) Let m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and vi > α{1,...,m} = αM . The proof is symmetric to (iii).
Before showing for Theorem 1 that statement (ii) implies statement (iii), we first prove the
following intermediate result that holds in both domains R and S.
Lemma 12. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and uncompromisingness.
Then, for each i ∈ N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that V ′−i = V−i, if vi ≤ v′i, then
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¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).26
Proof. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and uncompromisingness. Let
i ∈ N and pair V, V ′ ∈ RN be such that V ′−i = V−i. Since by peaks-onliness, vi = v′i implies
F (V ) = F (V ′), let vi < v′i. There are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ) and vi < v
′
i. Concerning the maximum alternative chosen, if
v′i ≤ F¯ (V ), then by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′). Let V 1i ∈ R be such that v1i =
F¯ (V ). Hence, by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V−i, V 1i ) = F¯ (V ). If v
′
i > F¯ (V ), then assuming
F¯ (V ′) < F¯ (V ) leads to a contradiction as follows. Begin from V ′ and let agent i change
his announcement to V 1i . Since F¯ (V
′) < v1i < v
′
i, by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V
′
−i, V
1
i ) =
F¯ (V ′). Thus, F¯ (V ′−i, V
1
i ) = F¯ (V−i, V
1
i ) contradicts F¯ (V
′) < F¯ (V ). Therefore, in both cases,
F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Concerning the minimum alternative chosen, assume Ri = Vi. Since vi <
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V ) ≤
F¯ (V ′), if
¯
F (V ′)) <
¯
F (V ), then single-peakedness implies bRi(F (V
′) Ri bRi(F (V )). Hence, if
at profile V agent i deviates by announcing V ′i , his best point improves. This contradicts
strategy-proofness. Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V )
Case 2. Let
¯
F (V ) ≤ vi < F¯ (V ) and vi < v′i. Concerning the maximum alternative chosen,
by the arguments presented in Case 1, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ). Concerning the minimum alternative
chosen, if
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ′) < vi < v′i and uncompromisingness imply ¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ′−i, Vi) = ¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ).
Case 3. Let F¯ (V ) ≤ vi and vi < v′i. Concerning the maximum alternative chosen, if F¯ (V ′) <
F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) ≤ vi < v′i and uncompromisingness imply F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ′−i, Vi) = F¯ (V ).
Similarly, concerning the minimum alternative chosen, if
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≤ vi < v′i
and uncompromisingness imply
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ′−i, Vi) = ¯
F (V ).
The last part of the proof of Theorem 1 follows. Notice that this part holds in both domains
R and S.
26Notice that this result simply shows that strategy-proofness and uncompromisingness imply peak-
monotonicity, a property that we refrain from introducing formally since it is only used in the “only
if” part of Theorem 1. Loosely speaking, this property requires the following: if an agent’s announced
peak moves to the right (left), then the chosen set also moves to the right (left).
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Proof of Theorem 1 (statement (ii) implies statement (iii)). Let F ∈ F satisfy un-
compromisingness. By Proposition 4, F satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. For
each i ∈ N , let pair V mini , V maxi ∈ R be such that vmini = 0 and vmaxi = 1. We proceed in
three steps.
Step 1. We show that at each announced profile V ∈ RN and for each i ∈ N , the
minimum chosen alternative is the median of: (i) the announced peak of i at profile V
(i.e., vi), (ii) the minimum chosen alternative if i changes his announcement to V
min
i (i.e.,
¯
F (V−i, V mini )), and (iii) the minimum chosen alternative if i changes his announcement to
V maxi (i.e., ¯
F (V−i, V maxi )). By symmetry of arguments, we do not show the equivalent result
for the maximum chosen alternative.
Let i ∈ N and V ∈ RN . Consider profiles V min = (V−i, V mini ) and V max = (V−i, V maxi ). Since
V−i = V min−i = V
max
−i and v
min
i ≤ vi ≤ vmaxi , by Lemma 12, ¯F (V
min) ≤
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V max).
There are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V min) ≤
¯
F (V ). Since 0 = vmini ≤ vi < ¯F (V ), uncompromisingness
implies
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ) = med(
¯
F (V min), vi,
¯
F (V max)).
Case 2. Let vi >
¯
F (V max) ≥
¯
F (V ). Symmetric proof to Case 1.
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V min) ≤ vi ≤
¯
F (V max). Assuming vi <
¯
F (V ) and thus
¯
F (V min) <
¯
F (V )
results in a contradiction as follows. Since 0 = vmini ≤ vi < ¯F (V ), uncompromisingness
implies
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ). Similarly, assuming
¯
F (V ) < vi and thus
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V max) results
in a contradiction as follows. Since
¯
F (V ) < vi ≤ vmaxi , uncompromisingness implies ¯F (V ) =
¯
F (V max). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) = vi = med(
¯
F (V min), vi,
¯
F (V max)).
Step 2. We construct two vectors α and β. In this step of the proof and in contrast to the
rest of the paper, we will use a different letter to label announced profiles (U instead of V ).
This is done in an attempt to facilitate the notation used in Step 3 of the proof that follows.
For each M ⊆ N , let UM ∈ RN be such that all agents in M announce 0 as their peak and
all other agents announce 1 as their peak, i.e., uM = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i ∈M
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i ∈ N \M
). Next, let vectors
α = (αM)M⊆N and β = (βM)M⊆N be such that αM =
¯
F (UM) and βM = F¯ (U
M), hence,
αM ≤ βM . Moreover, for each L,M ⊆ N such that L ( M notice the following. For each
i ∈M \L, uLi = 1 > 0 = uMi , and for each j 6∈M \L, ULj = UMj . Begin from profile UL and
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consider that all agents i (sequentially) change their announcements to UMi . Since u
L
i > u
M
i ,
by (sequentially) applying Lemma 12,both αL ≥ αM and βL ≥ βM .
Step 3. We show that F is a generalized median solution associated with vectors α and β
constructed in Step 2.
Let V ∈ RN . Without loss of generality, index the agents in N such that v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn.
Recall vectors α, β and profiles UM , for M ⊆ N , defined in Step 2. Let vectors α˜, β˜ ∈ An+1
be such that α˜ = (α∅, α{1}, α{1,2}, . . . , αN) and β˜ = (β∅, β{1}, β{1,2}, . . . , βN).
Since the coordinates of α˜ are such that 0 ≤ αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅ ≤ 1 and u∅ = (1, . . . , 1),
¯
F (U∅) =
med(u∅, α˜) = α∅. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, u{1,...,i} = ( 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}
)
implies
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = med(u{1,...,i}, α˜) = α{1,...,i}. Similarly for β˜, F¯ (U∅) = β∅ and for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, F¯ (U{1,...,i}) = β{1,...,i}.
Next, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let V i ∈ RN be such that V i = (V1, . . . , Vi, V maxi+1 , . . . , V maxn )
and notice that V n = V . We show that F (V ) = Fα,βG (V ) by induction, in two stages.
Stage 1. We show that F (V 1) = Fα,βG (V
1).
Consider profile V 1 = (V1, V
max
2 , . . . , V
max
n ). Recall profiles U
{1} = (V min1 , V
max
2 , . . . , V
max
n )
and U∅ = (V max1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Hence, U
{1} = (V 1−1, V
min
1 ) and U
∅ = (V 1−1, V
max
1 ). By Step 1,
¯
F (V 1) = med(
¯
F (U{1}), v1,
¯
F (U∅)) and F¯ (V 1) = med(F¯ (U{1}), v1, F¯ (U∅)). Hence,
¯
F (V 1) =
med(α{1}, v1, α{∅}) and F¯ (V 1) = med(β{1}, v1, β{∅}). Moreover, since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅ ≤ v2 =
· · · = vn and βN ≤ · · · ≤ β∅ ≤ v2 = · · · = vn,
¯
F (V 1) = med(v, α˜) and F¯ (V 1) = med(v, β˜).
Therefore, F (V 1) = Fα,βG (V
1).
Stage 2. Let i ∈ {2, . . . , n} be such that F (V i−1) = Fα,βG (V i−1). We show that F (V i) =
Fα,βG (V
i). Notice that we only show
¯
F (V i) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i). The proof showing F¯ (V i) = F¯α,βG (V
i)
is symmetric, that is, it can be obtained using the same arguments but after replacing all
references to the minimum chosen alternative and α˜ with the equivalent references to the
maximum chosen alternative and β˜ respectively.
Recall that V i−1 = (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V maxi , . . . , V
max
n ) and V
i = (V i−1−i , Vi). There are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi >
¯
F (V i). Since V i−1−i = V
i
−i and ¯
F (V i) < vi ≤ vmaxi , by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (V i−1) = med(vi−1, α˜). Thus, V i−1−i = V
i
−i and med(v
i−1, α˜) < vi ≤ vmaxi implies
¯
F (V i) = med(vi, α˜) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
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Case 2. Let vi <
¯
F (V i) and recall that U{1,...,i} = (V min1 , . . . , V
min
i , V
max
i+1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Since
v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and vi <
¯
F (V i), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, vminj ≤ vj < ¯F (V
i); hence, by
uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V i−j, V
min
j ) = ¯
F (V i). Therefore, beginning from profile V i and con-
sidering that all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , i} (sequentially) change their announcements to V minj ,
implies by (sequentially applying) uncompromisingness, that
¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) where as
shown above
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. Therefore, since at profile V i, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i},
vij < α{1,...,i}, and for each k ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, vik = vmaxk = 1 ≥ α{1,...,i}, by the median
operator,
¯
F (V i) = med(vi, α˜) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
Case 3. Let vi =
¯
F (V i). Since V i−1−i = V
i
−i and vi ≤ vmaxi , by Lemma 12, ¯F (V
i) ≤
¯
F (V i−1).
Thus, v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and vi =
¯
F (V i), imply vii−1 = v
i−1
i−1 ≤ ¯F (V
i−1). There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let vii−1 = ¯
F (V i−1). Thus, vii−1 = vi = ¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (V i−1). Hence,
¯
F (V i−1) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i−1) implies med(vi−1, α˜) = vi ≤ vmaxi . Therefore, by the median operator, ¯F (V
i) =
vi = med(v
i, α˜) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
(ii) Let vii−1 < ¯
F (V i−1). Recall that at profiles U{1,...,i−1} =
(V min1 , . . . , V
min
i−1 , V
max
i , . . . , V
max
n ) and U
{1...,i} = (V {1,...,i−1}−i , V
min
i ), ¯
F (U{1,...,i−1}) = α{1,...,i−1}
and
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. Since vi =
¯
F (V i) ≤
¯
F (V i−1), it follows that vi ≤ α{1,...,i−1}.
Next, begin from profile U{1,...,i} and consider that all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , i} (se-
quentially) change their announcements to Vj, i.e., the final new profile is V
i =
(V1, . . . , Vi, V
max
i+1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Since vj ≥ vminj , by (sequentially) applying Lemma 12, ¯F (V
i) ≥
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. Hence, vi ≥ α{1¯,...,i} and it follows, that α{1,...,i} ≤ vi ≤ α{1,...,i−1}.
Thus, since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, vector α˜ contains at least n + 1 − i coordinates not larger
than vi (i.e., coordinates α{1,...,i}, . . . , αN) and at least i coordinates not smaller than vi
(i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , α{1,...,i−1}). In addition, since v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, at least i agents
announce peaks not larger than vi (i.e., agents 1, . . . , i) and n − i + 1 agents announce
peaks not smaller than vi (i.e., agents i, . . . , n). Therefore, by the median operator,
¯
F (V i) = med(vi, α˜) = vi =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
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